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This research considers, from a doctrinal perspective, issues in the construction of contracts for the 
sale of EU carbon credits. These issues may arise due to the ways in which regulations of the EU 
carbon market relate to and affect such contracts. 
By a literature review, the EU carbon market and its regulations are investigated. Three governing 
effects of the regulations on EU carbon-credit transactions are discussed. First, the relevant 
regulations create rights to carbon credits. Second, the relevant regulations manage the issuance, 
allocation, transfer and cancellation of carbon credits in the registry system. Third, the relevant 
regulations control the behavior of commercial actors in the course of carbon-credit transactions. 
By searching literature relating to the development of the EU carbon market, it will be found that 
use of a master agreement is one of the standard contractual approaches to the sale of carbon 
credits on the EU carbon market, which agreement addresses the governing effects of the 
regulations on EU carbon-credit transactions. In the light of English contract law relating to the 
contract construction exercise in particular, this thesis analyses how contracts for the sale of EU 
carbon credits via a master agreement may interact with the EU regulations in two ways. First, a 
master agreement used for contracting for the sale of EU carbon credits is formed and performed 
under the EU ETS, thus is affected by conditions created by the relevant EU regulations. Second, 
terms of the master agreement are exercised in words and phrases that are identical to phraseology 
found in the regulations of the EU carbon market. 
These two ways in which the EU regulations relate to and affect contracts for the sale of EU 
carbon credits may generate two issues in the contract interpretation exercise. One is whether the 
words in the disputed contracts must be construed as normal contractual language or as legislative 
language. The other concerns the question of how the court might apply rules to identify the 
admissible “context”. It is shown that the modern approach to contract interpretation approach can 
shed light on resolving these two issues. 
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Introduction and Thesis Overview 
A Research Background and Inquiry 
This research has been prompted by two cases in particular: Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global 
Steel Ltd (“Deutsche Bank”), 1  and Armstrong DLW GMBH v Winnington Networks Ltd 
(“Armstrong”).2 In both cases, the court was required to apply the modern principles of contract 
interpretation to resolve the dispute that arose. 
Deutsche Bank concerns the interpretation of a term that prescribed the contractual performance of 
Total Global Steel Ltd (“TGS”) to sell and transfer Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”) to 
Deutsche Bank (“DB”). After the transfer, DB discovered that, due to an administrative check, the 
CERs had already been used and hence could not be used again for the purpose of the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”). The contract interpretation exercise in the case concerned 
two issues. First, the court had to construe what exactly DB had agreed to buy and TGS had agreed 
to sell under the contract. Second, the court had to construe whether TGS had breached the contract 
by transferring “used” CERs under the contract. 
The interpretation issue in Armstrong concerned a question of whether the buyer, Winnington, had 
purchased “in good faith” EU Allowances which the seller, Zen, had stolen from Armstrong. The 
interpretation of the “good faith” of Winnington involved interpreting whether Winnington had 
made reasonable efforts to conduct a “Know Your Customer” check, which the Court considered 
to be proper commercial behavior in the sale of carbon credits on the EU carbon-trading market. 
These two cases shared similar features. In both of them, the contracted-for carbon credits were 
said to be used for the purpose of the EU ETS, the contractual relationship in the sale of EU carbon 
credits was formed by using a type of standard trading agreement — a master agreement3— and 
relevant EU regulations were used by the court to construe the intentions of the disputing parties.  
Under the English law of contract, the judgments in these two cases took into account the EU 
carbon-market regulations to interpret the disputed EU carbon-credit transactions. The regulations  
                                                      
1        [2012] EWHC 1201 (Comm). 
2        [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch). 
3        In A Dictionary of  Finance and Banking (5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014), master agreement is  defined as 
“an overall contract within the terms of which individual transactions take place.” In both of the two cases, it was 
used by trading parties to conduct carbon credits transactions. 
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were used either literally in the disputed contracts or as the context within which the disputed contracts 
occurred. The reasoning and results of the two cases indicate: 
(1) the EU carbon-market regulations can have governing effects on EU carbon-credit 
transactions; 
(2) such governing effects can be addressed in standard trading agreements in relation to 
the sale and purchase of carbon credits on the EU carbon market; and 
(3) the English law of contract can influence the legal contractual dimensions of a 
trading relationship that was formed using standard trading agreements for the EU 
carbon-credit transactions. 
The two precedents thus inspire this research into contractual relationships in the sale of EU 
carbon credits. The principal inquiry of this research is that in the event of an alleged breach of a 
contract for the sale of EU carbon credits formed by using a standard trading agreement, how, if at 
all, might the EU regulations be relevant in construing the allegedly breached contract, and how 
might such relevance be addressed by the law relating to contract construction? A concrete 
example examined in the research is the “no-encumbrances” obligation in the written terms of the 
International Emission Trading Master Agreement (“IETMA”). If the IETMA is used to govern 
the contractual relationship in the sale of EU carbon credits, and the buyer alleges that the seller is 
in breach of the no-encumbrances obligation, could the EU regulations be relevant in the 
contractual construction exercise under English law, and how might such relevance be addressed? 
This principal inquiry will be explored by three sub-inquiries. The first sub-inquiry is to provide 
background information relating to the EU carbon market and to reveal how it is significantly 
affected by the governing effects of the EU regulations. The second sub-inquiry is to discover how 
such governing effects are reflected in standard trading agreements for the sale of EU carbon 
credits, particularly in the IETMA. The third sub-inquiry is to reflect on general rules of contract 
interpretation under English law and how they might be applied in construing disputed contracts 
for the sale of EU carbon credits where such transactions are governed by the EU regulations. 
Based on research relating to the three sub-inquiries, it is argued that the EU regulations may be 
relevant in two ways in construing an allegedly breached contract for the sale of EU carbon 
credits. However, uncertainties can exist in the application of the law relating to contract 
construction where the EU regulations are relevant. The hypothesis is that a purposive approach to 
contract construction can be developed as a consistent judicial approach in addressing the 
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relevance of the EU regulations in interpreting an allegedly breached contract for the sale of EU 
carbon credits. 
B Research Significance 
EU carbon credits are created and regulated by the EU law and regulations to serve a climate 
change regime. Transactional activities on the EU carbon market are highly regulated, yet no law 
or regulation has clarified the rights and interests that the trading parties can create and trade 
through carbon credits. The trading parties thus face uncertainties, as the right or interest they can 
claim as their commercial interests in the sale contract may not be clearly identified in the law or 
regulations. Also, multiple incidents have occurred in the history of the carbon market so as to 
show that carbon credits can easily attract competing rights, interests or claims. Therefore, the 
terms of the no- encumbrances obligation — one of the terms that defines the rights and interests 
associated with the contracted EU carbon credits — bear sufficient significance to warrant this 
research. Due to the space limitations of a thesis of this nature, it is necessary and helpful to focus 
the research on one model contract that is representatively used on the EU carbon market: the 
IETMA. 
Where the terms of the no-encumbrances obligation are allegedly breached, the manner in which 
the court goes about applying principles relating to contract interpretation will determine the 
outcome of the dispute. Therefore, it is significant to research the law of contract interpretation. 
The EU regulations, due to their governance of trading activities in the sale of EU carbon credits, 
must be researched to understand their relevance in creating and performing contractual 
relationships, as well as in contract interpretation. This research reviews and discusses the 
regulatory effects of EU regulations on the carbon market, pertaining to the analysis of their 
relevance in contractual performance in the sale of the EU carbon credits, as well as to the law of 
contract interpretation. Factors that can upset EU carbon market activities are discussed from the 
perspective of contract law, and the role of contract law is explored in carbon-credit transactions, 
which is a fairly new phenomenon in the contracting world. With the coming of the Paris 
Agreement, participation in the carbon market has become more active, calling for the linking of 
the carbon market under various jurisdictions. However, every domestic or regional emission-
trading scheme may approach carbon credits and their transactions differently. It can provide a 
challenge for parties in the performance of their carbon- trading contracts. In the case of disputes 
arising from the contract, judicial approaches to regulations involved in interpreting a contract for 
the sale of EU carbon credits can lack coherence and predictability. Meanwhile, as far as the 
commercial activities on the EU carbon market are concerned, the reformed EU regulations of the 
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carbon market have incorporated new rules that may be a trigger for breaching contractual 
performance. This thesis will elaborate on the significance of investigating the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme, the IETMA, and the no-encumbrances obligation in contracts for the sale of EU 
carbon credits. It will then elaborate on the significance of applying rules of contract interpretation 
in construing disputed contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits, and how the research inquiries 
and the hypothesis and arguments made accordingly can make a significant contribution to the 
post-Paris international regime of climate change. 
1  The Significance of the EU ETS 
The Emission Trading Scheme (“ETS”) is a market mechanism to mitigate climate change through 
a system of trading in carbon credits.4 The EU ETS is a scheme to facilitate trading in carbon 
credits. It was established in 2005 as part of European Union (EU) climate policy.5 It is by far the 
largest6 and most complex scheme for trading carbon credits and provides an example for the 
development of other emission trading schemes across the world.7 
2  The Significance of the IETMA 
Commercial contracts contribute significantly to managing risks of the EU carbon market, as well  
as achieving environmental goals.8 Contracts of the stock exchanges and of the Over-the-Counter 
(“OTC”) market comprise the main types of trading agreement on the EU carbon market. 9 
Similarities shared by contracts of the stock exchanges and of the OTC market include: (1) both 
are one-size-fits-all standardized documents; and (2) both choose the English law of contract as 
                                                      
4       Robert N Stavins, “Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments”  (Discussion  Paper 01-58, 
Washington DC, November 2001). 
5      John Black, Nigar  Hashimzade and  Gareth Myles,  A Dictionary of  Economics  (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 
2013). 
6       Nicholas, Linacre, Alexandre, Kossoy, Philippe, Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market (1 June 2011). 
The World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/270781468157764739/State-and-trends-of-the- 
carbon-market-2011. The EU carbon market was worth €106 billion in 2011, ibid 9–10. See also Kelvin F K Low 
and Jolene Lin, “Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, TragiCO2medy?” (2015) 27 Journal of 
Environmental Law 337. 
7      International Emission Trading Association (“IETA”), International Emission Trading Master   Agreement (16 
April 2012), 2. 
8      Sabina Manea, Instrumentalising Property: An Analysis of Rights in the EU Emissions Trading (a thesis submitted 
to the Department of Law of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, February 
2013) 91 http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/719/1/Manea_Instrumentalising_property_2013.pdf. 
9       Stock exchange and Over-the-Counter are two dominant ways of trading carbon credits on the EU carbon market. 
In the European stock market, eight per cent of the exchange-traded volume contributed by future contracts of EU 
carbon credits is traded through the office of the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) in London. The ICE platform 
is the most liquidated, pan-European platform for carbon emission trading. Another liquidated, pan-European 
stock exchange platform is the European Climate Exchange (“ECX”), which is owned by Climate Exchange Plc 
and listed on the London Stock Exchange’s AIM market. See State of the EU ETS Report (February 2016) Carbon 




their default governing law. However, where a dispute arises from an allegedly breached contract, 
the ordinary principles of contract interpretation may come into play to resolve a contractual 
dispute on the OTC, while disputes on the stock exchange would be resolved by transparent and 
clear-cut rules within the governance of the relevant stock exchange platform. For the purpose of 
research on the relevance of the EU regulations in interpreting contracts for the sale of EU carbon 
credits, contracts of the OTC market serve better than contracts of the stock exchange. 
On the OTC market, trading parties commonly use master agreements to enter into contractual 
relationships. Most trading parties on the EU carbon market use master agreements provided by 
the International Emission Trading Association (“IETA”). The International Emission Trading 
Master Agreement is one of those master agreements tailored by the IETA for emission trading. It 
intends to reflect and harmonize the contractual approaches of market participants trading in 
carbon credits across the world.10 
When the trading parties choose the IETMA to enter into a contract for the sale of EU carbon 
credits, their contractual relationship will be governed by not only the main terms of the IETMA, 
but also by the terms of other documents attached to the IETMA, such as an EU ETS Trading 
System Schedule. 
3  The Significance of the No-Encumbrances Obligation in the IETMA11 
In the IETMA, a no-encumbrances obligation is part of Clause 5, “Allowance Transfers”. Clause 
5.1 (a) provides as follows: 
The Delivering Party agrees to sell and Transfer and the Receiving Party agrees to purchase 
and accept the Period Traded Allowances. 
Also provided in Clause 5.3 is the following: 
The Delivering Party shall Transfer to the Receiving Party the Period Traded Allowances 
free and clear of all liens, security interests, claims and encumbrances or any interest in or to 
them by any person. The consequences of a breach by a Party of its obligations under this 
                                                      
10      IETA, Above n 7, 2. 
11      Apart from the IETMA, the ISDA Master Agreement also contains the terms containing a “no-encumbrances” 
obligation. Their expressions of the obligation and the consequences of its breach are highly similar.] 
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Clause will be in accordance with the terms specified in the relevant Executed System 
Schedule.12 
The phrase “a breach by a Party of its obligations under this Clause” indicates that the Delivering 
Party, who transfers the carbon credits, is not necessarily the only party who has no-encumbrances 
obligations under Clause 5.3; the Receiving Party, who accepts the carbon credits, may also have 
an obligation under this clause. 
The words “consequences of a breach by a Party of its obligations under this Clause will be in 
accordance with the terms specified in the relevant Executed System Schedule” indicate that the 
regulations of the emission-trading scheme under which the carbon credits are sold provide 
reference points in the protection of a Party’s contractual rights in the sale of the carbon credits.13 
The EU ETS System Schedule provides the consequences of a breach of the no-encumbrances 
obligation, including: 
(1) the remaining contract remains unaffected;14 
(2) the Delivering Party is liable to pay the Encumbrance Loss Amount to the Receiving 
Party;15 or 
(3) under certain conditions, the Delivering Party can be relieved from undertaking 
liabilities for the Encumbrance Loss Amount suffered by the Receiving Party.16 
Therefore, the terms of the “no-encumbrances” obligation in the IETMA reflect the rights and 
interests that contracting parties can have on the contracted for carbon credits. However, the EU 
regulations have not clarified the legal nature of carbon credits, which causes uncertainty to market 
participants as to the rights and interests they can have on the carbon credits that are the subject 
matter of their sale.17 What is more, changes in the EU regulations have to this point in time 
confounded the legal nature of the carbon credits.18 
                                                      
12      IETA, IETMA v.1.0, (16April2012), Clause5.3. 
13      IETA, IETMA v.1.0, (16 April 2012), Schedule 4 EUETS System Schedule, Clause 5.3.1—Clause 5.3.4. 
14      IETA, IETMA v.1.0, (16 April 2012), Schedule 4 EUETS System Schedule, Clause 5.3.1. 
http://www.ieta.org/resources/Legal%20WG/IETMARELEASEAPRIL201/uk-2866191-v7-ietma_schedule_4_- 
       _eu_ets_schedule.pdf. 
15      Ibid, Clause 5.3.2 and Clause 5.3.3. 
16      Ibid, Clause 5.3.4. 
17      Low and Lin, above n 6. 
18      Ibid. 
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4  The Significant Role of Contract Interpretation 
It has been observed that similarities are shared by contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits and 
certain contracts for the sale of a particular entitlement in English law. 19  Carbon credits are 
entitlements to emissions. Both book debts and charge backs are types of entitlement to a financial 
asset.20 Trading in carbon credits, as well as in book debts and charge backs, have all been subject 
to certain market regulations. In two cases relating to book debts and charge backs, it is shown that 
only the law, not the contracting parties, can define the legal nature of a particular type of 
entitlement in commercial contracts.21  In In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (In Liq),22  the court held that 
legal categorisation of book debts in the security documentation drafted by the bank had no legal 
effect, regardless of whether the drafting was based on the customary practices of the bank. In Re 
Charge Card Services Ltd,23 the court also held that legal categorisation of charge backs in the 
security documentation, which was drafted based on the common practice of banks, should not 
take on legal effect. Although the contractual relationship is self-decided by the parties and 
overseen by contract law in accordance with its traditional role,24 the commercial interests that the 
parties intend to achieve in their contractual arrangements may be rejected by the courts due to 
certain aspects in contractual performance being regulated by laws and public policies.25 So, in the 
case of disputes arising from trading EU carbon credits, performance of the disputed terms can be 
governed by the EU regulations. Contract interpretation of such terms can show whether, and if so 
to what extent, the courts will be influenced by public regulations while interpreting private 
contracts. It may provide clues to the contracting parties whether the commercial interests that they 
intend to achieve may be rejected by the courts, due to the judicial approach judiciously taken to 
the relevance of EU regulations in contract interpretation. 
5  The Significant Role of the Post-Paris International Regime of Climate Change 
The negotiation and adoption of the Paris Agreement triggered a huge response from the global 
carbon market. Leading international associations and business organizations, representing 
industries and companies trading in carbon credits, advocated the importance and benefits of the 
carbon market under the climate change regime. Linking the carbon markets of individual 
domestic trading schemes was promoted. Most of the advocates were European companies. The 
                                                      
19      Manea, above n 8, 93. 
20      Joanna Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 382. 
21      Sabina Manea, above n 8, 95. 
22      [2005] 2 AC 680. 
23       [1987] 1 Ch 50. 
24       Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, 2002) 56–57, 67–68. 
25      Ibid 94. 
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advocating statements were made and signed in a session organized by the IETA. The post-Paris 
International Regime of Climate Change shows the enthusiasm for trading in carbon credits, with 
the carbon market under the EU ETS being the driving force and the IETA being the leading 
representative of market participants. As the market participants would like to increase their 
commercial activities in trading carbon credits, the instabilities in their contractual relationships 
may increase. On the one hand, no law or regulation has clarified the rights and interests that can 
be contracted for in the sale of carbon credits. On the other hand, the trend of linking different 
domestic and regional carbon market indicates the difficulties of unifying the regulation of trading 
in carbon credits across various jurisdictions. For contractual relationships in pursuit of 
commercial interests on the EU carbon markets in particular these will face new challenges due to 
the reformation of the EU ETS after the Paris Agreement. 
The revised EU ETS directive has introduced a market stability reserve plan to reduce the current 
oversupply of allowances. A certain amount of allowances will be reserved and not traded on the 
market. Allowances that are not used within a certain period of time will be withdrew into the 
market reserve. At this time, such allowances would still be valid, but they cannot be traded. After 
a certain duration of reservation, if still unused, the allowances will become invalid and cannot be 
used. This can affect the existing contracts for the sale of the EU carbon credits in two ways. First, 
the contracted allowances are required to be reserved and cannot be traded and may become 
invalid after a period of reservation. Second, prices may go up due to a reduction in the supply of 
the credits. Contractual disputes may arise, and relevant EU regulations will be engaged in contract 
interpretation. 
So, in a post-Paris international climate change regime, this research still provides insight into the 
relevance of EU regulations in connection with the performance of contracts for the sale of carbon 
credits and in the law relating to the interpretation of disputed contractual performance, as well as 
in connection with resolving the uncertainties that thus arise. 
The significance of the EU ETS, the IETMA, the no-encumbrances obligation in the sale of EU 
carbon credits, the role of contract interpretation, and the post-Paris international regime of climate 
change together justify the conduct of this research. 
C Statement of the Problems 
Relevant EU regulations create a carbon market and govern carbon-credit transactions that occur 
within that market. Their governing effects on the sales of EU carbon credits can infiltrate in 
contractual relationships in the sale of EU carbon credits from the beginning to the end. On the one 
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hand, an agreement by which the parties enter into a contractual relationship can reflect the 
governing effects of the EU regulations that the parties recognize as relevant to their contractual 
performance. On the other hand, judicial approaches to disputed issues in the sale of EU carbon 
credits can be affected by the EU regulations in terms of both the law of contract interpretation and 
the legal outcomes. The relevance of the EU regulations to the sale of EU carbon credits gives rise 
to the problems that this research intends to investigate. Take an example to illustrate what kind of 
problems may arise. 
The IETMA contains the following provisions: 
Clause 4.2(a): “[Each Party shall] … ensure that it has one or more Holding Accounts validly 
registered in a Registry in accordance with the Trading System Rules.”26 
Clause 5.1(a): “[T]he Delivering Party agrees to sell and Transfer and the Receiving Party agrees 
to purchase and accept the Period Traded Allowances subject to and in accordance with … the 
relevant Trading System Rules.”27 
Clause 6.1: “[T]he Delivering Party shall make a Transfer Request in accordance with the Trading 
System Rules …”28 
Part 1(a) of Schedule 4 EU ETS System Schedule to the Master Agreement states: “All EU ETS 
Transactions are subject to the EU ETS Trading System Rules.”29 
“Transaction” is defined in the IETMA to mean an agreement that trading parties make to 
undertake commercial transactions that involve the transfer of carbon credits.30 
“EU ETS Trading System Rules” are defined in Schedule 4 EU ETS System Schedule to the 
Master Agreement. They include the rules and regulations of participation in, and operation of, the 
EU ETS as applicable in the EU and a Member State as amended from time to time.31 
These provisions indicate that the relevant EU regulations can influence a contract for the sale of 
EU carbon credits in two ways: 
1. Contractual performance in the sale of carbon credits must comply with regulations of 
                                                      
26      IETA, IETMA v.1.0 (16 April 2012), Clause 4.2. (a). 
27      IETA, IETMA v.1.0 (16 April 2012), Clause 5.1 (a). 
28      IETA, IETMA v.1.0 (16 April 2012), Clause 6.1. 
29      IETA, IETMA v.1.0 (16 April 2012), Part 1(a) of Schedule 4 EU ETS System Schedule. 
30      Ibid. 
31      Ibid. 
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that carbon market. Obligations of having Holding Accounts, to transfer and to accept the 
carbon credits, and to make a Transfer Request must be “in accordance with” the EU ETS 
Trading System Rules. Moreover, the obligation of transfer must be “in accordance with 
and for the purposes of the relevant Trading Systems”.32  
2. The contract is “subject to the EU ETS Trading System Rules”. The binding legal force of 
terms of an EU ETS transaction starts from the moment the parties agree to the terms 
of such a transaction.33 The terms of an EU ETS transaction include those in the main 
body of the Master Agreement, in the attached documents of the EU ETS System 
Schedule, and in Confirmations.34The terms that can be considered the contract for the 
sale of EU carbon credits can be assessed as to whether they are subject to the EU ETS 
Trading System Rules. 
When a dispute arises in relation to a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits, it is possible that 
the relevant EU regulations will be involved in the interpretation of that contract for the purposes 
of resolving the dispute. First, the relevant EU regulations can be involved in construing the 
enforceability of the disputed agreement; interpretation is needed as to the parties’ intentions in 
providing that “all the EU ETS Transactions are subject to the EU ETS Trading System Rules”. 
Second, the relevant EU regulations can be involved in construing the obligations provided in the 
disputed agreement, as performance of contractual obligations must be “in accordance with” EU 
ETS transactions. 
The general rule of English law in contract interpretation is that an objective assessment must be 
made on the actual words of the contract in its surrounding circumstances. Those words must be 
understood as if the parties were reasonable persons having all the background knowledge that 
would have been reasonably available to them. 35So, in contract interpretation, both the actual 
words of the contract and “the background knowledge” are key factors. Under two different 
approaches — a literal approach and a purposive/contextual approach — case law provides many 
examples showing the complexities in construing what the actual words of the contract are and 
                                                      
32      IETA, IETMA, 40. 
33    “The Parties intend that they shall be legally bound by the terms of each Transaction from the moment they agree   
to those terms (whether agreed orally or otherwise)” IETA, IETMA (at 16 April 2012), Clause 3.1. 
34    “All Transactions (as defined in Schedule 1 (Definitions) below) are entered into in reliance on the fact that the 
Master Agreement, any Executed System Schedule(s) and all Confirmations evidencing individual Transactions 
together form a single agreement between the Parties (this ‘Agreement’), and the Parties acknowledge and agree 
that they would not otherwise enter into any Transactions.” IETA, IETMA (at 16 April 2012), Clause 1.2. 
35      Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 1101 [14] per Lord Hoffmann. 
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what “the background knowledge” is, as well as the meaning of the actual words and effects of 
“the background knowledge”. 
The illustrative example given is that parties use the “IETMA” to sell and buy EU carbon credits. 
As previously noted, the IETMA provides that: (1) carbon-credit transactions that are entered into 
using the IETMA are subject to regulations that govern such transactions; and (2) the EU Trading 
Schedule of the IETMA, which are drawn from relevant EU regulations, states that all EU carbon-
credit transactions are subject to the regulations. This research is particularly interested in the 
issues that can arise from the contract interpretation exercise, which is how the relevant EU 
regulations might be involved in the contract interpretation exercise. How would legal rules be 
applied where the relevant EU regulations contain terminology that is identical to the relevant 
wording of the contract? How would legal rules be applied where the contracting parties in the sale 
of EU carbon credits draw on the relevant EU regulations as part of background information? 
If the phraseology of the contract is identical to terminology used in the relevant EU regulations, 
the first problem is whether the words of the contract should be attributed with a natural meaning, 
as if they were ordinary language, or understood as technical words. The second problem is, if the 
EU regulations were to be attributed with the natural meaning of ordinary language, what would be 
the “background knowledge” known to or assumed by the parties at the time the contract was 
executed? If they were understood as technical words, what would be the “background 
knowledge” in this situation? 
If the relevant EU regulations were taken as context, the first problem is this: Would the 
regulations amended from time to time be considered the “background knowledge” known to or 
assumed by the parties at the time the contract was executed, for the purpose of ascertaining their 
natural meaning? The second problem is this, would such common terms and phrases as “good 
faith”, “best endeavours” and “reasonable endeavours” be attributed with an accepted legal sense 
in decided cases, 36  or would their accepted meanings be changed because their respective 
meanings are to be ascertained in the light of the EU regulations as the “background knowledge”?  
“Background knowledge” usually excludes prior negotiations or the parties’ “declarations of 
subjective intent”. 37  Extrinsic evidence such as antecedent agreements, oral negotiations, 
                                                      
36     Legal dictionaries such as Daniel Greenberg, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 9th ed, 2016) and David Hay, Words and Phrases Legally Defined (LexisNexis UK, 4th ed, 2007), which 
collate the enormous body of case law on judicial interpretation, are useful sources of reference for the meaning of 
common terms and phrases. 
37     Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR  896.  The court cannot 
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exchanges of letters, etc, preceding the contract are not considered to be relevant “background 
knowledge”.38 However, those inadmissible forms of evidence may be considered to ascertain the 
meaning of an unusual word that the IETMA does not define or that cannot be readily attributed 
with an ordinary meaning.39 So, the EU regulations that govern carbon-credit transactions, which 
are background information in a broad sense, may not be admitted as the “background knowledge” 
if they are considered part of the extrinsic evidence; the exception is that they must be used to 
ascertain the meaning of an unusual word that the IETMA does not define or that cannot be readily 
attributed with an ordinary meaning. 
D Project Description 
The project assesses, from the perspective of contract law, the interpretation of contracts for the 
sale of EU carbon credits, which are formed by using the IETMA, to resolve disputes over an 
alleged breach of the no-encumbrances obligation and its consequences. The special feature of 
interpreting terms of the IETMA is that certain necessary conditions or aspects in the performance 
of certain terms can be governed by relevant EU regulations. The focus of this project is how the 
rules of contract interpretation might be applied to construing those terms whose performance 
depends on activities or events that are governed by relevant EU regulations. To complete a thesis 
under this overarching theme, the research was undertaken in three stages, during which materials 
that have been canvassed include: 
(1) Regulations of the EU carbon market and the transactional aspects of carbon-credit 
sales that they govern. These research materials help to discover the role of the EU 
regulations in relation to EU carbon-credit transactions; 
(2) The standard contractual terms used in connection with carbon-credit transactions that 
are governed by regulations of the EU carbon market. These research materials help 
to discover how the relevant EU regulations are addressed by standard trading 
agreements of EU carbon-credit transactions; and 
(3) The general rules of and judicial approaches to contract interpretation under English 
law to resolve disputes in the event of an alleged breach of a contract. These research 
materials help to analyse the application of legal rules in construing contracts that are 
made under the IETMA. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
generally consider subsequent conduct in order to determine the parties’ original intentions. An exception is where 
a contract is partly oral and partly written. 
38      If, instead of construing the contract, the court is being asked to rectify it, extrinsic evidence is admissible. 
39     Rugby Group Ltd v ProForce Recruit Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 69. 
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1  The First Stage: Summary of EU Regulations 
Relevant regulations of the EU carbon market include the EU Directive 2003/87/EC and its 
revisions (as the Directive or the Directives), the Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 and 
its revisions (as the Regulation or the Regulations), and the reformed Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (“MiFID”). 
The EU Directive 2003/87/EC is the legal foundation of the existence of the EU carbon market. It 
defines, entitles and validates rights of market participants to the carbon credits that they sell and 
purchase. It decides the availability and tradability of carbon credits in carbon-credit transactions. 
The Commission Regulations provide and monitor procedures of the issuance, holding, use and 
transfer of carbon credits in the registry system. These are the practical matters necessary in the 
delivery and acceptance of carbon credits in market transactions. The reformed MiFID will govern 
market behavior in carbon-credit transactions. The legal standard of proper market behaviour 
indicates the boundary of activities by which buyers and sellers can successfully accomplish 
carbon-credit transactions. 
Based on material examined at the first stage, it can be shown that the EU regulations play a role in 
governing EU carbon-credit transactions, which creates background information that buyers and 
sellers would consider when entering into a transaction in the EU carbon-trading market. Such 
information can contain: the relevant EU regulations that provide the legal basis on which carbon 
credits are available and that regulate the amount of carbon credits that are available, as well as the 
legal persons to whom carbon credits are available, and at what time and by what means carbon 
credits become available; the relevant EU regulations that define what type of carbon credits can 
be used, the amount of carbon credits that can be used, the rights and interests for which carbon 
credits may be used, the means by which carbon credits can be used and the title under which 
carbon credits are used. Then, the research comes to the second stage, how the EU regulations in 
carbon-credit transactions have influenced contract-making to provide rights and obligations of 
contracting parties in the transactions. 
2  The Second Stage: Summary of Standard Trading Agreements on the EU Carbon Market 
As in every kind of sale, parties can use contract as a tool to create, define and identify the rights 
and obligations of each other, and to manage risks in contractual performance. Research materials 
at the second stage include the most common ways of trading on the EU carbon market, which 
include stock exchanges and OTC, and standard trading agreements that market participants would 
use for carbon-credit transactions on stock exchanges and OTC. The IETMA, which is the 
example used in this thesis, provides that a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits that is made 
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under the IETMA will be subject to the regulations of the EU ETS, and performance of the 
contract must be in accordance with the relevant regulations. The relevant EU regulations may 
play the role of effectuating a contractual relationship made under the IETMA, or the role of 
informing parties to make a contract under the IETMA. 
3  The Third Stage: Summary of the English Law of Contract 
The third stage of the research focuses on the English law of contract interpretation in resolving 
disputes in the event of an alleged breach of a contract for the sale of carbon credits. English law 
has been the common choice of governing law in standard carbon-market practice. Specifically, it 
is the governing law of the IETMA. 
In short, the English law of contract interpretation can be summarized as: (1) two steps; (2) one 
general rule; and (3) and two approaches. 
(1) Two steps. The courts undertake two steps in contract construction. First, they must 
ensure that the disputed terms are validly incorporated in the contract. Second, they 
must ascertain the meaning and legal effect of those terms.40 Legal study is conducted 
to ascertain the rules of contract interpretation applied at the first step, which is a 
process of identifying the terms, as well as rules of contract interpretation applied at 
the second step, which is a process of construction. 
(2) One general rule. Under English contract law, by contract interpretation, the courts 
ascertain and give effect to the parties’ apparent intention. The parties’ intention is to 
be ascertained based on an objective assessment of the wording of the contract in its 
surrounding circumstances or context.41 The wording of the contract is understood as 
the document in which the parties express their agreement.42 Legal study is conducted 
to ascertain various applications of this general rule, different identifications as what is 
an objective assessment, what is the wording of the contract, and what is the scope of 
surrounding circumstances or context. 
(3) Two approaches. In general, the wording of the contract can be understood in its  
“ordinary grammatical meaning” 43  or with respect to the commercial purpose or 
apparent object of the transaction (where the ordinary grammatical meaning might be 
                                                      
40      Evan Mackendrick, Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 10th ed, 2013) 159. 
41       Ibid. 
42      Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85. 
43      Ibid. 
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at odds with that commercial purpose or apparent object).44 Legal study is conducted to 
identify cases on contract interpretation where a literal approach was adopted and 
where a purposive or contextual approach was adopted. 
E Thesis Structure and Chapters Outline 
This thesis comprises five chapters, with Chapter One as an introduction and Chapter Five as a 
conclusion. Chapter One, which is this chapter, summarizes the subject matter of the research and 
a project plan to conduct the research. Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Four will, 
respectively, present the research   that has been completed in relation to each compartment of the 
project. Chapter Two will present the regulations of the EU carbon market and discuss how they 
govern the EU carbon-credit transactions. Chapter Three will present the trading agreements for 
transactions on the EU carbon market and essay how they reflect the influence of the relevant EU 
regulations in making, performing and enforcing contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits. 
Chapter Four will discuss the English case law in contract construction, to illustrate how the 
courts may approach the EU regulations that must be used to ascertain the meaning and legal 
effect of words or phrases in a standard contract for the sale of EU carbon credits. Chapter Five, 
the final chapter, reviews all three components of the project and summarizes the principal 
research findings. 
Chapter Two overviews relevant EU regulations of the EU carbon market. Such regulations 
include the EU Directives, the Commission Regulations, and a few of the financial regulations. 
Relevant EU regulations recognize what kind of carbon credits can be used to comply  with 
emission obligations. Recognized by the EU regulations, allowances, such EU Allowances 
(“EUA”) and project-based offsets, such as Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”), are the two 
main types of carbon credits on the EU carbon market. Under certain conditions set by the EU 
regulations, they can be used to comply with emission obligations or be transferred in the EU 
registry system. Also, both legal entities and persons, as long as they meet conditions set by the 
EU regulations, can participate on the EU carbon market purposes, either for compliance with 
emission reduction obligations or for financial speculation. 
                                                      
44      Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 1 WLR 1580, 1589. 
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The EU Directives and the Commission Regulations govern the EU ETS. When the market has 
developed under the ETS, it adopts traits of a financial market. So, market oversight, particularly 
financial regulation, has been given the effects of governing market behaviour under the EU ETS. 
The Directive of the EU ETS defines and controls the validity, quantity and tradability of 
allowances. Pursuant to the Directive of the EU ETS, the Commission Regulation of the EU ETS 
regulates the issuance, holding and transfer of allowances. Those regulations give rise to the legal 
requirements for the successful and lawful delivery of allowances. The market oversight 45 
addresses VAT fraud, theft of allowances, market manipulation, and issues relating to trading 
allowances through the financial market. 
To enter into a transaction for the sale of EU carbon credits, the trading parties should know 
whether the carbon credits that they agree on are valid, tradeable, available and transferrable under 
the EU ETS. They should also know whether their conduct in completing the agreed transaction 
will comply with certain financial regulations. These factors are also risks in the performance of 
EU carbon-credit transactions. The relevant regulations can change. The carbon credits, which 
were valid, tradeable, available and transferrable under the EU ETS can become invalid, non-
tradeable, unavailable and non-transferrable. Or, conduct of the trading parties in completing the 
agreed transaction may subsequently be disapproved of by the financial regulations. In an EU 
carbon-credit transaction, the governing effects of the relevant EU regulations will become pre-
contractual conditions and post-contractual risks for the contracting parties. Such risks, through 
contracting, must be allocated between the parties, in terms of who should bear the responsibility 
of carrying or avoiding the risks. 
Chapter Three overviews the development of the EU carbon market through to this current state, 
which shows the effort of market participants to maximize their commercial interests in the face of 
regulatory risks. The policy design of the EU ETS did not anticipate that the carbon market would 
flourish as a financial market, and carbon credits have been increasingly often sold through the 
stock exchanges and OTC. 46  Accordingly, the mainstream trading agreements are the master 
agreements and the stock exchange contractual documents. 
                                                      
45      European Commission Communication, Towards an enhanced market oversight framework for the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme [2010] COM, 796 final. 
46      PricewaterhouseCoopers, How to assess your green fraud risks (2011) PWC UK
 <http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/greenfraud.pdf> 7. 
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The main goal of using these two trading forms and their agreements is to reduce regulatory risks 
and maximize commercial interests. Disputes arising from EU carbon-credit transactions under 
such agreements can mean that the contracting parties encounter disputes over allocation of the 
regulatory risks between them. Legal resolution of these disputes reflects how the commercial 
interests are protected in the face of the regulatory risks. The regulatory risks to the market 
participants, however, are risks posed by the regulations, which have their own purposes and 
meanings. By resolving conflicts between commercial interests, the governing law of the trading 
agreements for the sale of EU carbon credits re-allocate regulatory risks between the contracting 
parties. To re-allocate regulatory risks, the original allocation of such risk would be interpreted in 
terms of what risk of what regulation the parties initially intend of to allocate in what particular 
way. The disputes will be resolved in relation to the regulations. 
Chapter Four discusses in what kind of relation the regulations stand to the interpretation of the 
original allocation of regulatory risks in the disputed terms. One of the trading agreements, the 
IETMA, will be selected as an example for discussion. 
It is in the light of the English law that the IETMA provide rights and obligations of the contracting 
parties in the sale of EU carbon credits. One of the risks in contractual performance is that a third 
party has a right or an interest in the contracted-for carbon credits. Such a risk is addressed in terms 
of a contracted “no-encumbrances” obligation. Certain EU regulations are relevant to the terms. In 
the interpretation of an alleged breach of the no-encumbrances obligation, the court will address 
those relevant EU regulations. 
First, Chapter Four will reflect on rules of English law in construing whether a valid contract was 
formed. Once it can be found that a valid contract for the sale of EU carbon credits was formed 
under the terms of the IETMA, the terms of the no-encumbrances obligation will be construed in 
the light of the whole text of the contract against its surrounding circumstances. 
Chapter Four will then reflect on the English law relating to contract construction. Under the 
general principle of contract interpretation under English law, the whole text, i.e. the actual words 
of the agreement and the scope of its admissible evidence, will be identified. The literal approach 
and the purposive or contextual approach are the two general approaches in English law to identify 
objectivity and admissibility. Two recent cases have applied the purposive or contextual approach 
to construing contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits. These two cases are able to demonstrate 
show the relevance of the EU regulations in application of the purposive/contextual approach to 
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contract construction, and how such relevance affects assessment of objectivity and admissibility of 
the context in those two cases. 
In the light of the relevance of the EU regulations in the two cases, it is further illustrated how the 
EU regulations can be relevant to the interpretation of a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits. 
It is supposed that the IETMA is used by the contracting parties to structure their relationship. It is 
shown that EU regulations are in two ways relevant to in the contract interpretation exercise. They 
can either be taken as literal words of the disputed terms, or else as a source of background 
knowledge against which the disputed terms were agreed. Depending on which way the court 
views the relevance of the EU regulations, the law relating to contract interpretation can be applied 
differently. 
Chapter Five concludes the thesis by summarizing the answers to each of the sub-inquiries and the 
principal research inquiry. 
In short, to the first sub-question, the answer will be summarized from the explanation of the 
governing effects of the EU regulations on EU carbon-credit transactions in Chapter Two. The EU 
regulations govern the definition of and legal title to EU carbon credits that are the subject matter 
of a sale on the EU carbon-credit market, as well as their availability and transferability in the 
registry system and acceptable behaviour in the course of the EU carbon-credit transaction. 
To the second sub-question, the answer will be summarized based on Chapter Three, which shows 
how the governing effects are reflected in the written terms of a standard trading agreement for the 
sale of the relevant EU carbon credits. Commonly, on the EU carbon market, carbon credits are 
traded OTC and through stock exchanges. A typical trading agreement, such as the IETMA, will 
provide that to a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits to be valid, it must be identifiable from 
the terms that the contracted for carbon credits are for the purpose of the EU ETS. It is expected 
that all transactions must be subject to the rules of the EU ETS. 
To the third sub-question, the answer will be summarized based on Chapter Four, which makes 
arguments on the general rules of contract interpretation under English law, as well as their 
possible application in construing a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits. The relevance of EU 
regulations in the contract interpretation exercise will be discussed in an example. Presuming that 
the IETMA is used to structure a sale contract for EU carbon credits, and presuming the buyer 
alleges that the seller is in breach of the no-encumbrances obligation, then three stages of contract 
interpretation can occur. The first is to determine the validity of the disputed term incorporated as 
contractual terms. The second is to interpret the words of the term and ascertain the parties’ 
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intention so that the nature and scope of the no-encumbrances obligation can be determined. The 
third stage is to determine whether, and if so how, the breaching party may bear the liabilities for 
the breach. Under English contract law, at every stage of contract interpretation the court makes an 
objective assessment of the language of the contract in its surrounding circumstances in order to 
ascertain the parties’ apparent intention. This intention can be garnered through either a literal or a 
purposive/contextual approach, but which approach is taken can affect the court’s perception of 
“natural and ordinary meaning” and their identification of admissible context. 
Where the interpreted words are identical to words used in the EU regulations, their “natural and 
ordinary meaning”47 may be ascertained in their admissible “context”48 by the literal approach or 
the purposive/contextual approach. The incorporated EU regulations may be interpreted as words 
and phrases of “the contract” or just as “the regulations”. The “context” of interpreting them 
literally as contractual words and phrases can be different than when they are literally interpreted 
as the words and phrases of the regulations. By a purposive approach, the context of interpreting 
the incorporated EU regulations as the words and phrases of a private contract and as words or 
phrases possessing a regulatory nature would also be different. If the interpreted words are non-
regulation words, by the literal or the purposive approach, the ascertainment of their “natural and 
ordinary meaning” can be affected by the admissibility of the EU regulations as their context. The 
relevance of EU regulations in contract interpretation can give rise to these variations and 
potentially result in different legal consequences for the contractual relationship in the sale of EU 
carbon credits in the event of an alleged breach. 
By placing the governing effects of the EU regulations of the carbon market in the light of contract 
interpretation, this thesis provides a unique perspective on the law and practice of EU carbon-
credit transactions. 
 
                                                      
47      BCCI v Ali (No 1) [2002] 1 AC 251. 
48      Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 3 All ER 237; Reardon Smith Line Pty Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 3 All    




The EU Carbon Market: Transactions and 
Regulations 
The EU ETS is a “cap and trade” system.49 Based on its legal rules, EU Allowances (“EUAs”) are 
issued as legal entitlements “to emit one tone of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specific period 
of time”.50 Under the EU ETS, the legal entitlements to emissions can also be represented by 
Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”). CERs are generated according to the legal rules of a 
“baseline credit” system — the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”). One CER represents a 
unit of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (“GHG”) reduction in the form of one metric ton of carbon 
dioxide that was achieved by a CDM project.51 Both CERs and EUAs are usually referred to as 
“EU Credits” or “Allowances” in the trading agreements, such as the IETMA. In terms of 
representing legal entitlements to emissions, they have no difference. A holder of a CER has the 
same legal entitlement as a holder of an EUA. However, they may have different prices on the 
market. Therefore, this thesis also uses “EU Credits” or “EU Allowances” to refer to both CERs 
and EUAs. When a contract for the sale of CERs or EUAs is disputed, contract construction is 
necessary, and the EU regulations become relevant in interpreting the agreement for the sale of the 
“EU Credits”. 
The regulations governing the issuance, holding, use and transfer of EU Credits are a matter for 
discussion in this chapter. They are relevant to commercial activities on the EU carbon market, 
because they define what carbon credits are, what valid carbon credits are, and what are tradeable 
carbon credits; they monitor procedures for the transfer of carbon credits between accounts in the 
Registry system; and they prescribe certain behaviors on the part of the market participants. 
Meanwhile, contracts are a source of governance of contractual relationships in carbon-credit 
sales. The contracts regulate the performance of the obligations that buyers and sellers owe to each 
other in the delivery or acceptance of carbon credits. The contractual terms are seen as expressions 
of parties’ common intentions as to the meaning of the carbon credits that shall be delivered and 
accepted, the meaning of delivery and acceptance and expected behaviors in performance of the 
                                                      
49     R Kerry Turner, David Pearce and Ian Bateman, Environmental Economics: An Elementary Introduction 
(John Hopkins UP, 1993) 181. 
50     Article 3, directive 2003/87. 
51      http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/globalwarming2ed/n123.xml. 
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delivery and acceptance of carbon credits. Those matters are governed by the regulations of the EU 
carbon market. 
This chapter will introduce the regulations of the EU carbon market and their governing effects. 
Specifically, the regulations under discussion include regulations governing EU Allowances in 
terms of their definitions, validity and tradability, regulations of issuance, holding, use and transfer 
of the EU Allowances, and regulations governing the EU carbon-market behaviour. The governing 
effects of the regulations on the EU carbon credits and traders’ transactional activities are 
significant in contractual construction when performance of a contractual obligation in the delivery 
and acceptance of carbon credits is disputed. The dispute may be that the EU Allowances that were 
transferred were not as was provided by the agreement, in terms of their definition, validity, 
tradability, quantity or price. 
A The European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
The EU Emission Trading Scheme (the “EU ETS”) is defined as “the cornerstone of the European 
Union’s policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial greenhouse gas 
emissions cost-effectively”.52 This definition suggests that the EU ETS is a fundamental instrument 
to support the operation of EU climate policy, and its objective is to use economic incentives to 
reduce industrial greenhouse gas emissions. 
The EU ETS is established by the Directive 2003/87/EC (hereinafter “the Directive 2003”) ,53 
which the EU Commission (“EC”) identifies as “climate-related legislation”.54 The Directive 2003 
was amended by Directive 2004/101/EC,55 Directive 2008/101/EC,56 and Directive 2009/29/EC.57 
Collectively, they are known as “the Directives”. The EU ETS is in the nature of a legal instrument 
                                                      
52     Climate Action, European Commission, EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm>. 
53     Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32. 
54     Climate Action,  European  Commission,  EU   law   on   climate change and  protection  of the ozone  layer    
        <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/about-us/climate-law_en>. 
55      Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the 
Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms [2004] OJ L338/18. 
56      Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
[2009] OJ L8/3. 
57      Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 




for the operation of EU climate policy. The Directives of the EU ETS provide the main principles 
and core rules of emission trading, including the source of emissions and emitters, allocation 
methods, principles of monitoring and reporting emissions, the rules of surrendering allowances, 
the use of a registry, linking with other mechanisms, and the enforcement mechanism. The EU  
Member States are required to implement the Directives into their national laws. Based on the 
Directives, detailed EC regulations and decisions are implemented regarding monitoring 
procedures and requirements of emissions, 58  the third-party verification system for auditing 
emission reports, 59  the functioning of a registry system by which allowances are issued, 
surrendered, transferred and cancelled,60 and the regulations  of linking with other emission trading 
schemes. They have immediate legal enforceability to the EU Member States who have 
implemented the Directives. Activities under the EU ETS are highly regulated. 
Incentives to participate in the EU ETS are generated by the creation of a “cap” and subsequent 
ability to trade if the cap is not exceeded. The “cap” means the amount of annual emissions that 
should not be exceeded in certain period of time.61 In the context of the EU ETS, entities that are 
restricted by the “cap” are named as installations, which consist mainly of large emitters.62 They 
obtain greenhouse gas emission permits from authorities of the EU ETS. The greenhouse gas 
emission permit acts as acceptance of the emitter under a “cap-and-trade” scheme, because the 
authorities acknowledge its ability to monitor and report emissions. So, participating in a “cap-
and-trade” scheme gives the emitter a right to emit, which is expressed as an “allowance”. 
Meanwhile, the emitter is obligated to not exceed the “cap”, i.e. the maximum amount of 
emissions it can emit during a defined period of time. An economic benefit of trading allowances 
incentivizes emitters to participate in the EU ETS. Allowances or rights to emit, can be traded. 
At the end of a period, a participating emitter must have sufficient allowances to cover its 
emissions, so as to show that it does not exceed the “cap”. Otherwise, it will be penalized. The 
                                                      
58     Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas 
emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council) [2012] OJ L181/30. 
59     Commission Regulation (EU) No 600/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the verification of greenhouse gas emission reports 
and tonne-kilometre reports and the accreditation of verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [2012] OJ 181/1. 
60      Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 
1193/2011 [2013] OJ L122/1. 
61      Climate Action, European Commission, EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS)    
        <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en>. 
62     They mainly include certain power companies, energy-intensive industries and commercial airlines. Edwin 




participating emitter must monitor and report its emissions and must register its allowance 
transactions. In summary, allowances indicate rights to emit. It is a legal right. And it is a legal 
basis for trading allowances. Under the EU ETS, the rights to emit can be represented by 
allowances, as well as by offsets to a certain degree. 
B Validity of Allowances in the EU ETS 
Article 3(2) the EU Directive63 defines “allowance” to mean an allowance to emit one tone of 
carbon dioxide equivalent64during a specified period, which shall be valid only for the purposes of 
meeting the requirements of the Directive and shall be transferable in accordance with the 
provisions of the Directive. 65  In first and second trading phase (2005–2008 and 2008–2012, 
respectively), an allowance to emit greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous Oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6), all of which can be calculated by metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
allocated by an EU Member State, mostly free of charge, would be allocated to operators 66 of 
installations. 67  Simply put, during 2005–2008 and 2008–2012, economic actors should not 
undertake activities in Annex I68 of the Directive69 unless they acquired greenhouse gas emissions 
permits, from a national competent authority. One installation can apply for one greenhouse gas 
emissions permit that allows it to undertake the banned polluting activities and to emit CO2, CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6. 
The validity of an allowance must also be defined by legal rules of the Directive or by legal rules 
that have been developed pursuant to the Directive. And validity is a necessary precondition to the 
transferability of an allowance. Validity of an allowance is first defined by Article 13 of the 
Directive: 
Allowances shall be valid for emissions during the period referred to in Article 11(1) or (2) for 
                                                      
63    Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC. 
64     Ibid, art 3(j): “tone of carbon dioxide equivalent” means one metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) or an amount   
of any other greenhouse gas listed in Annex II with an equivalent global-warming potential. 
  65      Ibid, art 3(a). 
  66      Ibid, art 3(f): “operator” means any person who operates or controls an installation or, where this is provided for              
           in national legislation, to whom decisive economic power over the technical functioning of the installation has   
           been delegated. 
  67     Ibid, art 3(e): “installation” means a stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I are      
          carried out and any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection with the activities    
           carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution. 
  68      Categories of Activities that cannot be undertaken since 2005 unless the installation was allocated with permits. 
  69      Ibid, art 4. 
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which they are issued. 2. Four months after the beginning of the first five-year period 
referred to in Article 11(2), allowances which are no longer valid and have not been 
surrendered and cancelled in accordance with Article 12(3) shall be cancelled by the 
competent authority. Member States may issue allowances to persons for the current period 
to replace any allowances held by them which are cancelled in accordance with the first 
subparagraph 3. Four months after the beginning of each subsequent five-year period 
referred to in Article 11(2), allowances which are no longer valid and have not been 
surrendered and cancelled in accordance with Article 12(3) shall be cancelled by the 
competent authority. Member States shall issue allowances to persons for the current 
period to replace any allowances held by them which are cancelled in accordance with the 
first subparagraph.70 
Article 11(1), of the Directive identifies the first trading phase, 2005 to 2007. An allowance that 
was allocated into 2005 to 2007 was valid in terms of being used by an installation to cover one 
unit of its emission equivalent to one tone of carbon dioxide. If this allowance was not surrendered 
at the end of 2007, it could not be used to cover an emission produced from 2008 to 2012, which 
was the second trading phase identified in Article 11(2), of the Directive. It did not have validity in 
terms of being surrendered for an emission produced from 2008 to 2012. It should have been 
cancelled after four months, i.e. 30 April 2008, 30 April being the latest date for an allowance to be 
surrendered for an emission produced in the previous calendar year. Before 30 April 2008, an 
allowance that was issued into the first trading phase but not surrendered would still be valid for an 
emission produced in 2007, but it would not be valid for an emission in 2008. After 30 April 2008, 
an allowance that was issued into the first trading phase but not surrendered would be cancelled 
and replaced with another allowance, which would be valid for an emission in 2008. 
It may seem simple that the time of issuance of an allowance determines its validity for an 
emission of a particular trading period. During the time that an allowance is valid, it will be 
transferrable. In respect of trading allowances, validity and transferability are two elementary 
aspects of the seller’s performance obligations in respect of delivery of the allowances to the 
buyer. The market for emission trading is driven by legal entitlements of allowances to emissions. 
Allowances that cannot be surrendered have no market demand. And only valid allowances can be 
transferred. But validity is not the only precondition for the transferability of allowances. 
Allowances might be valid yet not transferrable. And allowances that have been transferred may 
                                                      
70     Ibid, art 13. 
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not be valid. Regarding allowances issuances, transfers, surrenders and cancellations, legal rules of 
emission trading have generated complexity in the tradability of allowances. 
C Legal Complexity in Trading Allowances 
A normal compliance cycle of an allowance starts from its allocation and proceeds through to its 
transfer, surrender and cancellation. Allocation, surrender and cancellation are operated within the 
registry system of the EU ETS, whereas transfer can occur within the EU ETS registry system or 
between the EU ETS registry system and registry system of another ETS. In the first and second 
trading period, 2005 to 2007, and 2008 to 2012, the EU ETS registry system consisted of registries 
of Member States and the Commission registry. Both the Member States and the Commission are 
considered parties to the EU ETS. Each of their registries contains party holding accounts,71 
operator holding accounts,72 and person holding accounts.73 Registries of Member States and of the 
Commission are operated and maintained by registry administrators.74 A Community Independent 
Transaction Log (“CITL”) is established to manage the movement of an allowance in its 
compliance cycle and is operated and maintained by a Central Administrator.75 Since the third 
trading period, the EU ETS registry system has replaced the registries of Member States and the 
Commission registry with a single Union Registry. The Union Registry directly contains party 
holding accounts, operator holding accounts, and person holding accounts opened by eligible 
persons of each Member State. A European Union Transaction Log (“EUTL”) has replaced the 
CITL. 
In the beginning, the EU registry system was established pursuant to Article 19 of Directive 
2003/87/EC. An allowance is to be transferred in the EU registry system, in accordance with the 
Directive.76 The registry system is defined in Article 19 of the Directive. It is a standardized 
                                                      
71     Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 
1193/2011 [2013] OJ L 122/1, art 19. 
72     Ibid, art 17. 
73      Ibid, art 18. 
74      Ibid, art 13. 
75     Ibid, art 13. The person designated by the Commission pursuant to Article 20 of Directive 2003/87/EC to operate   
and maintain the Community independent transaction log. 
76     Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse  Gas  Emission  Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32. In order to implement this 
Directive, the Commission shall adopt a Regulation in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 23(2) 
for a standardised and secured system of registries in the form of standardised electronic databases containing 
common data elements to track the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of allowances, to provide  for public 
access and confidentiality as appropriate, and to ensure that there are no transfers incompatible with obligations 
resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. 
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electronic database. An allowance is recorded and accounted by the registry system as an 
electronic number. The registry system tracks the issuance, holding, transfer, surrender and 
cancellation of an allowance. The transaction log, either the CITL or the EUTL, tracks the 
movement of the allowance between accounts. Without being available in the form of a digital 
number in the registry system, an allowance cannot be recorded, accounted or tracked; therefore, it 
is not transferable. Availability of an allowance in the form of a digital number is another 
necessary factor, apart from validity, that can affect successful transfer in trading allowances. 
Aspects of an available allowance include: when the allowance becomes available, to whom the 
allowance is available, where the allowance is available, and when the allowance becomes 
unavailable. 
In the first and second trading periods, allowance were allocated by the registry administrator of a 
national registry to the party holding accounts. Then the allowances would be allocated to relevant 
operator holding accounts. The allowances can then be transferred between operator holding 
accounts, or between operator holding accounts and persons holding accounts, and then between 
person holding accounts. The allocation of allowances can cause uncertainty to successful transfers 
of allowances in two respects: quantity of allocated allowances, and tradability of allocated 
allowances. 
1  Quantity of Allowances 
The total quantity of allocated allowances in the first and second trading periods depended on the 
National Allocation Plans (“NAPs”)77 of EU Member States. An EU Member State decided its 
total quantity of allowances is consistent with its emission limitation obligations pursuant to 
Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as other EC or national climate policies. 
Then Allowances would then be allocated to an individual installation, mostly free of charge.78 In 
trading phase three, the EC, based on National Implementation Measure (“NIMs”) submitted by 
the Member States, decided emission limitation obligations for individual installations. 79 An 
installation can be allocated with allowances according to its emission limitation obligation, partly 
through auctioning, partly free of charge.80Both NAPs and NIMs are subject to approval of the EC 
and possible revisions of the Member States during the trading period. 
                                                      
77     Ibid, art 9(1). 
78     Ibid, art 10. 
79     Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community [2009] OJ L140/6, art 10. 
80      Ibid. 
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The EC may discover that the NAPs or NIMs do not comply with the emission limitation 
obligation allocated to the Community and to the Member States under the Kyoto Protocol 
pursuant to the Commission Decision 2006/944/EC of 14 December 2006. Or it may discover that 
the methodology that NAPs or NIMs is short of equality and transparency, which would be against 
the “objective and transparent criteria” referred to in Article 9(1) of the Directive. The criteria are 
explicitly set out in Annex III of the Directive.81 
Apart from assessment and possible intervention from the central administrator, the total quantity 
of allowances that a Member State plans to allocate is also subject to public consultation82and state 
aid rules under Article 87(1) EC. The total quantity of allowances that a Member State has already 
started allocating to operators might be amended, due to rejection by the Commission within 
three months of notification of its NAP.83 The total quantity of allowances for a trading period 
caused concern to private parties. The legal rules of the ETS determine the market scarcity of the 
allowances. For example, US Steel Kosice appealed against the decision of the European 
Commission, which caused ex-post adjustment to the first NAP of the Slovak Republik.84 Cemex 
UK appealed against the Commission Decision of 29 November 2006, which concerned the NAP 
of the UK.85 It complained against inadequate and unlawful allocation of allowances. These two 
cases were ruled inadmisable by the European Court of First Instance, because the private parties 
were not affected individually and directly. However, if amendments were made by the national 
authority of the NAP, instead of the European Commission, the result might be different. The 
amendment would increase the total quantity of allocated allowances to the extent that it exceeded 
the quantity authorised by the Commission in its Decision of 7 July 2004. The EC rejected the 
amendments proposed by the Member States as inadmissible, such as in the case of Drax Power.86 
Again, the appeal was dismissed. The European Court of First Instance again ruled on the ground 
that the private parties were not affected individually and directly. As a result of the EU refusals, 
                                                      
81     Annex III contains binding criteria that must be applied in the allocation of allowances: criteria (2) — assessments 
of emission developments), (5) — non-discrimination between companies and sectors), (9) — involvement of the 
public) and (10 — list of installations), and some elements of the criteria (1 — the Kyoto commitments), (3 — 
potential to reduce emissions) and (4 — consistency with other legislation). It also contains optional criteria: (1 — 
the Kyoto commitments), (3 — potential to reduce emissions) and (4 — consistency with other legislation), and 
the criteria (6 — new entrants), (7 — early action), (8 — clean technology) and (11). 
82     Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 17. 
83     Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 3 and art 9. 
84      T-489/04. 
85      T-13/07, OJ C 56, 10 March 2007, 37. 
86      T-130/06, 15 July 2006. 
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the total quantity of allowances in a Member State must be reduced, which meant more obligations 
and fewer tradable allowances for the private parties. 
Legal treatment of the EC decisions on NAPs shows the EC’s preference a stricter total quantity of 
allowance rather than a more tolerant one. The impact of the EC decisions would be considered 
non-individual and indirect. However, from the perspective of the private parties, and indeed they 
have constantly contested against such decisions that have decreased the total quantity of 
allowances on the market, the EC intervention in NAPs definitely was an uncertainty that should 
be of concern in trading allowances. This is a particular uncertainty to buyers and sellers who enter 
into contracts for the sale of allowances that would be allocated for the next trading period. They 
might estimate the amount of allowances that could be available for trading purposes, based on a 
prediction of their NAP.87 However, the estimated amount of allowances may be significantly 
reduced due to disapproval by the EC. 
The quantity of allowances can also change after they were adopted and approved by the EC. 
Implementation of approved NAPs to allocate the total quantity of allowances and to allocate the 
allowances to operators can take at least three months before the beginning of the first trading 
period, and at least 12 months before the beginning of the second trading period. Again, buyers 
and sellers, based on expectation on approved quantity of allowances for the upcoming trading 
period, can enter into contracts in respect of the future allowances. During this period, 
amendments on the approved NAPs can cause uncertainty in relation to trading allowances. In 
comparison, the legal treatment of ex-post amendments by the Member States to the NAPs 
provided by the Directive generally does not allow for ex-post amendments, with two exceptions.88 
First, if an installation is closed during the trading period, its operator should not be allocated with 
allowances as planned. Second, entry of a new entrant 89  should enable extra allocations of 
allowances in addition to the quantity in the plans. 
A couple of cases have involved a change in the allocated allowances in the event of closure of 
installations during trading periods. Article 11(2) of the Directive 2003 provides that operators of 
                                                      
87      Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art (1), (2) and art 11 
88      Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 11(2). 
89     “New entrant” means any installation carrying out one or more of the activities indicated in Annex I, which has 
obtained a greenhouse gas emissions permit or an update of its greenhouse gas emissions permit because of a 
change in the nature or functioning or an extension of the installation, subsequent to the notification to the 
Commission of the national allocation plan. 
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installations that are closed during a trading period will not be allocated with allowances. 
However, it does not clarify whether such operators can maintain allowances that have already 
been allocated and which are still held in their accounts. There was a case brought by an Italian 
private association, Buzzi Unichem. Buzzi Unichem contested the ex-post alteration of the NAP, 
which forbade it to maintain the allocated allowances in the event of closing its installation.90 
Another case concerned ex-post adjustment to the Germany NAP. Germany discovered that the 
estimation of a company’s emission by the NAP was higher than the actual emission. Allowances 
that had been allocated according to the estimation therefore should have been reduced. The EC 
rejected the Germany decision to adjust the quantity of allowances as planned. It said that 
operators who do not produce as much emissions as predicted should keep the extra allowances. 
The Court of First Instance ruled that, in the light of the Directive’s objectives, the legality of the 
ex-post adjustment in this case should not have been called into question by the EC,91 and that 
operators who do not produce as much emissions as predicted should not keep the extra 
allowances. 
Also, allocation of allowances to operators must be “in conformity with the requirements of the 
Treaty, in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof”.92 And Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty regulate 
state aid so as to not result in distortion of competition to threaten the common interest of the EU. 
For example, a Member State, in order to assist its installations in compliance with emission 
limitation obligations, may adopt a methodology that can result in the over-allocation of 
allowances.93 
Regarding ex-post amendments to NAPs during the trading period, not all legal treatment by the 
Court of the First Instance was in conformity with provisions of the Directive. Other circumstances 
may arise that are not covered by the Directive. Whether ex-post adjustments may arise, in which 
circumstances they may arise, and their legal consequences, would be unpredictable to buyers and 
sellers who made sale contracts of allowances that have not yet been allocated according to the 
adopted NAP. Uncertainty would also be caused to allowances that have been allocated. Due to 
ex-post adjustment of NAPs, if the allocated quantity of allowances should be reduced, the reduced 
                                                      
90      T-241/07, OJ C 211, (8 September 2007) 38. 
91       T-374/04, (7 November 2004). 
92      Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance    
         Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 10 and art 11. 
93       T-387/04, OJ C 6, 8 January 2005, 38. 
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number must be transferred out of the holding accounts, whether they were party, operators or 
person holding accounts, so as to be cancelled.94 
2  Tradability of Allowances 
Supply and demand within the carbon market are created and regulated by legal rules of the EU 
ETS. The rules design emission limitation obligations, which create market demand. The rules 
also design allowances as legal entitlements to emissions, which create market supply. When the 
legal rules adjust quantities of allowances that shall be allocated and the emission “cap”, market 
scarcity of the allowances is affected. Consequently, the market price of allowances fluctuates. 
Legal entitlements to emission allowances to emissions drive operator-type purchasers who must 
comply with emission limitation obligations. Non-operator-type purchasers, such as brokers or 
trading houses, are driven by speculation on the future price of allowances. The future price of 
allowances will increase when market scarcity is created, as the legal rules tighten the “cap” and 
quantities of allowances to be allocated. The price, i.e. the commercial value of the allowances, is 
thus based on the fact that allowances are legal entitlements to emissions. Legal entitlement to 
emissions is the essence of tradability of allowances. It gives commercial purpose to entering into 
a contract for the sale of allowances. Legal entitlement to emissions must be determined by 
reference to legal rules of the EU ETS. 
Operators are the initial recipients of allowances. To receive the allowances in the first and second 
trading period, operators must open operator holding accounts in the relevant national registry. 
Other non-operator persons must also open person holding accounts in the national registry in 
order to acquire and to sell allowances. Member States can also use their party holding accounts, 
which were also set in the national registry, to acquire and to sell allowances. As a result of sale 
contracts, the transfer of allowances takes place among party holding accounts, operator holding 
accounts and person holding accounts. Allowances sale can lead to transfer. But the fact that 
allowances can be transferred does not indicate that they definitely have tradability. Allowances 
that have been successfully transferred, or that have been held in a holding account, may not have 
tradability. Uncertainty exists in the purchase of allowances, as buyers may think the allowances 
that they have purchased are perfectly held by the holding accounts from which they were going to 
be transferred, and the transfers were successful, but they turned out to be revocable, surrendered, 
borrowed, banked or securitized. The legal rules of the EU ETS that identify the legal entitlements 
                                                      
94   Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art 38(2). 
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in relation to the purchase of revoked, surrendered, borrowed, banked or securitized allowances, 
and whether such credits still carry legal entitlements to emissions, will be investigated. 
(a) Allowances Issued Based on a Revoked Permit 
As previously mentioned, an operator of an installation must first obtain a greenhouse gas permit 
to participate in the cap-and-trade scheme, and then to be allocated with allowances. However, its 
greenhouse gas permit might be revoked if it did not carry out its obligations of monitoring, 
reporting and verifying emissions, or if its permit expired, or was reviewed and revoked. 95 
Revocation of a greenhouse gas permit will lead to closure of the operator’s holding account/s. 
Between the date of revocation of the permit and the date of closure of the holding account/s, a 
positive balance of allowances in the operator’s account, if any, can be transferred to another 
account within the registry system.96 Envisage that this operator had made a contract for the sale of 
allowances with a buyer whose account was in a registry of another emission  trading scheme with 
which the EU ETS is linked.97 Now those allowances cannot be transferred out of the EU registry 
system due to revocation of the permit. In the event of revocation of a greenhouse gas permit, 
allowances that have been allocated under the permit still generate legal entitlements to emissions 
under the EU ETS. But they cannot be transferred to the registry system of another emission 
trading scheme. With the increase of linking between the EU ETS and other emission trading 
schemes,98 sellers in the EU ETS and buyers from other emission trading schemes may need to 
specify with which trading scheme the contracted allowances will have tradability. 
(b) Surrendered Allowances 
Allocation of allowances takes place by 28 February of each year of a trading phase. No later than 
30 April of each year, the amount of allowances equivalent to annual emissions of an installation 
must be surrendered by the operator of that installation. For the first trading phase, on 30 June of 
each year of a trading phase except the first year, the amount of allowance that must be cancelled 
is equivalent to the amount of allowances that must be surrendered between 1 January 2005 to 30 
June 2006, 30 June 2006 to 30 June 2007, and 30 June 2007 to 30 June 2008. For the second 
trading phase, cancellation of allowances must also occur also on 30 June, and the amount of 
                                                      
95     Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community [2009] L 140/63, art 4. 
96      Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art 17. 
97      Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 12 and art 25. 
98      Legal entitlement to emissions under one trading scheme can be used for another. 
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allowances that must be cancelled must cover the amount of allowances that must be surrendered 
between 1 January 2008 on 30 June 2009, and since 30 June of the preceding year on 30 June of 
the subsequent years. For example, an allowance that was issued on 28 February 2005 would be 
surrendered by 30 April 2006 and then cancelled by 30 June 2006. Between 30 April 2006 and 30 
June 2006, after it was surrendered and before it was cancelled, it still therefore was in a party 
holding account or an operator holding account. What would be the consequences if the allowance 
is sold? 
A transfer of allowances as a result of sale contracts works to transfer the legal entitlement to the 
allowances. The actual use of the legal entitlement to allowances takes place upon surrender of the 
allowances. The surrender of allowances by an operator for an installation takes place by 30 April 
of each year of a trading phase. Allowances would be transferred by the registry administrator from 
an operator holding account into the party holding account, or by entering the number of 
transferred allowances into the surrendered allowance table for that year. 99  The surrendered 
allowances would be cancelled by the registry administrator on 30 June of each year of a trading 
phase. The registry administrator transfers allowances from the party holding account to the 
retirement account.100 Between 30 April and 30 June, a certain amount of surrendered allowances 
is held in party holding accounts, awaiting cancellation. However, party holding accounts can also 
be used in the acquisition and sale of allowances. It becomes uncertain whether the surrendered 
allowances in the party holding accounts still have legal entitlements to emissions, and whether 
they can still be sold and then transferred from the party holding accounts to other holding 
accounts of other buyers. Allowances that are awaiting cancellation also include allowances that 
were recorded as surrendered by entry in the surrendered allowance table. It means that those 
allowances, before the cancellation date, would still remain in the operator’s holding accounts. 
Whether they can still be sold and then transferred by the operator was not explicitly stated by 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004. Those allowances may still be capable of transfer 
from the operator’s holding accounts as a result of acquisition and sale. In essence, the question is 
whether the relevant EU regulations affect the tradability of allowances whose legal entitlements to 
emissions have been used, which may be inferred from Article 13(2) and (3) in Directive 2003: 
                                                      
99      Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art 52. 
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Four months after the beginning of the first five-year period referred to in Article 11(2), 
allowances which are no longer valid and have not been surrendered and cancelled in 
accordance with Article 12(3) shall be cancelled by the competent authority. 
Four months after the beginning of each subsequent five-year period referred to in Article 
11(2), allowances which are no longer valid and have not been surrendered and cancelled 
in accordance with Article 12(3) shall be cancelled by the competent authority. 
Both Directive and Commission Regulation are revised for the third trading period. A single Union 
Registry has been established. Member States open national holding accounts, operators open 
operator holding accounts, and non-operator persons open holding or trading accounts directly 
under the Union Registry. Party holding accounts are replaced by national holding accounts and 
will not hold allowances surrendered by operators. Surrender of allowances takes place by transfer 
of allowances into the Union allowance deletion account,101  or by recording “the number and type 
of transferred allowances as surrendered for the emissions”. 102  Article 67(3) in Commission 
Regulation 2013 103 clearly states: “an allowance that was already surrendered may not be 
surrendered again”. And “surrender” is defined as “the accounting of an allowance by an operator 
or aircraft operator against the verified emissions of its installation or aircraft”. Once allowances 
are accounted against emissions that have been verified for installation of an operator in the 
previous year, they are being used as legal entitlements to emissions; they cannot be accounted 
again for emissions. 
The subsequent change in the legal rules of the EU ETS, which increased the uncertainty regarding 
the legal entitlements attached to surrendered allowances, can cause issues to contract for the sale 
of surrendered allowances made before the revision of the Directive and the Commission 
Regulation. Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global Steel Ltd104 is such a case where a contractual 
dispute arose from the prevention of the use of surrendered carbon credits under the EU ETS. The 
                                                      
101    Surrender of allowances has the same effect as deletion of allowances. Surrender of allowances takes place by 
transfer of allowances into the Union allowance deletion account. And “deletion” is defined as “the definitive 
disposal of an allowance by its holder without accounting it against verified emissions”. 
102    Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 
1193/2011 [2013] L 122/1, art 67. 
103    Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 
1193/2011 [2013] L 122/1. 
104    Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global Steel Ltd, [2012] EWHC 1201 (Comm). 
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judicial reasoning in that case, which concerned the interpretation of the legal entitlement to 
surrendered allowances, will be discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
(c) Revocable Allowances 
The Commission Regulation of the EU ETS recognizes allowances as legal entitlements to 
emissions and considers them intangible assets. The Commission Regulation that was amended in 
2013105specifies that finalized transactions106cannot be revoked. Even if a transaction is finalized 
by mistake, it cannot be revoked. However, the seller can exercise rights or claims resulting from 
the mistaken delivery of allowances.107 
On the other hand, under certain conditions, such as unintentional or erroneous transfer for 
surrender or deletion, the transferred allowances may be revocable.108 However, the unintentional 
or erroneous transfer of allowances due to sale would still be considered finalized transactions and 
in principle should not be reversed. This is because the transfer of allowances for sale purposes 
does not lead to the end of the compliance cycle of the transferred allowances. The ability of 
market supply of legal entitlements to emissions is not impaired.  The transfer of allowances by 
reasons of surrender or deletion means that the transferred allowances cannot be circulated on the 
market again, and the surrendered or deleted allowances should have no legal entitlements as a 
result. It also includes an implication that the exchange of international credits for allowances is 
considered a way of using the legal entitlement to emissions. 
It can be inferred that, in principle, legal entitlements of allowances are transferred with the 
transfer of allowances in sale contracts; the legal entitlements of allowances are used when they 
are transferred into surrender accounts or deletion accounts. Allowances that are not transferred 
into surrender accounts but are recorded as surrendered 109are recognized as having the same 
consequence as allowances transferred into surrendered accounts. “An allowance that was already 
surrendered may not be surrendered again.” 110 Thus, it does not constitute part of the market 
supply. Its tradability ends. In the case of trading allowances, the simple holding of allowances 
entitles the holder to transfer allowances for whichever purpose is chosen. Simply holding 
                                                      
105    Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 
1193/2011 [2013] L 122/1. 
106    Ibid, (8). 
107     Ibid, art 40. 
108     Ibid, art 70(2). 
109     Ibid, art 67 1(b). 
110     Ibid, art 67 3(3). 
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allowances is prima facie evidence that the holder has legal title to the allowances. It does not 
matter whether the holder actually has the legal title. The tradability of allowances results 
essentially from that fact that the legal entitlements of the allowances still remain with the holder 
of their legal title.111 Holders of allowances that were recorded as “surrendered allowances” still 
have the prima facie legal title according to Article 40 of the amended Commission Regulation in 
2013. But the legal entitlements of the surrendered allowances are used, and the allowances have 
no tradability. If allowances in a holding account have not been surrendered, but they were 
purchased in the absence of good faith, the purchaser does not acquire actual legal title to the 
allowances. Nonetheless, as the holding of allowances is prima facie evidence of legal title to the 
allowances, this means that the holder may still be able to initiate transfer of the allowances either 
for surrender or under a contract of sale. The difference is that, according to Article 70 of the 
amended Commission Regulation 2013, finalized transfer of allowances for surrender can be 
revoked on basis of erroneous transfer. According to Article 40, finalized transfer of allowances as 
a result of a contract of sale cannot be revoked. Although holders who have gained allowances in 
the absence of good faith cannot acquire legal title to the allowances, the allowances can 
continuously be transferred from one account to another, as a result of contracts of sale. The 
succeeding purchasers, if in absence of good faith, cannot claim legal title to the allowances in 
question, either. However, the transaction is irrevocable. An uncertainty may occur in relation to 
the final purchaser of allowances. For example, D, an operator, acted in good faith and purchased 
allowances from C. C did not act in good faith when purchasing the allowances from B. B stole the 
allowances from A. The transactions from B to C to D would be irrevocable, and A the original 
holder who still had the legal title cannot claim revocation of the transfers. D surrendered the 
allowances. The original holder, A, may be able to claim that surrender of allowances was an error 
and requested revocation. 
The tradability of allowances is not affected by who actually has legal title to allowances. It is 
determined by whether legal entitlements of the allowances are diminished. The expiry date of the 
legal entitlement is when the allowances are transferred into the Union Allowance deletion account 
or entered into the allowance surrender table. However, under certain conditions, the surrender or 
deletion of allowances can be revoked, and the allowances can again be traded. 
                                                      
111    The legal titles of the allowances are not necessarily remained with holders of the allowances. In the 




(d) Banked and Borrowed Allowances 
For example, in the first trading period 2005–2007, if an allowance was not surrendered from the 
date of its issuance until the end of 2007, it was still valid for the trading period of 2005–2007, 
but it was not valid for the next trading period 2008–2012 and had to be cancelled on 1 May 
2008.112 
But the rules did not prevent the said allowances from being surrendered by 30 April of 2008, 
which was the latest date to be accounted against emissions verified for the year 2007. The 
allowances could still be used as legal entitlements to emissions, hence having market demand. 
For example, an installation may need extra allowances to cover its emissions in 2007. 
It can be said that the ability of allowances to be used as legal entitlements to emissions confines 
their tradability, rather than the year into which they are issued. In a new trading phase, 
allowances that remained from the previous trading phase can still be accounted against emissions 
in the previous trading phase. The contracting parties in a sale of allowances must clarify whether 
the contracted allowances are to be used for the previous trading phase or the current trading 
phase, so as to differentiate them from their replacement allowances. 
Allowances that were not used in the trading phase into which they were issued will be replaced 
with the same quantity of allowances.113 In the beginning of the first year of a new trading phase, 
allowances that have not been surrendered or cancelled in the previous trading phase are not valid 
for emissions in the new trading phase but may still be valid for emissions in the previous trading 
phase. Within the same trading phase, allowances that have not been surrendered or cancelled in 
the last year are still valid for emissions of the same trading phase. Four months after the 
beginning of a five-year period,114which would be January 2005 to April 2005, January 2008 to 
April 2008, and January 2013 to April 2013, allowances that were not used to comply with 
                                                      
112   Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art 60 and art 61. 
113    Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured system 
of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art 60 and art 61; Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and 
No1193/2011[2013] L 122/1, art 57. 
114    Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 11(2). 
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emission obligations in the previous trading period would await cancellation and replacement.115 
The replacement allowances are usually called “banked” allowances. “Banked” allowances are 
not allowances that were not used, but rather allowances that will be issued to replace unused 
allowances. And such replacement allowances will be issued into the new trading phase and will 
be valid as legal entitlements to emissions for the new trading phase. In the new trading phase, the 
allowances that were not used and not valid can still be used before 1 May of the first year of the 
new trading phase, as legal entitlements to emissions for the last trading phase. However, since 
they are not valid as legal entitlement to emissions in the new trading phase, and only valid 
allowances are transferrable, they would lack tradability on the market.116 
Allowances are also capable of being borrowed. This means that an allowance can be used as a 
legal entitlement to emission in the calendar year immediately preceding the vintage year for the 
allowance. The borrowing of allowances is made possible due to the legal rules on allowance 
allocation and surrender. Allowances are allocated by 28 February of each year, and allowances 
for emissions in previous year must be surrendered by 30 April. Between 28 February and 30 
April, the newly allocated allowances can be used for emissions in the previous year. 
By the legal rules, allowances can be banked and borrowed. Forward sale of allowances is 
therefore possible. For instance, in 2013, A may have sold to B allowances that will be issued in 
2021 to replace allowances that A did not use in the third trading phase (2013–2020). Or A may 
sell to B before 28 February 2021 the allowances that will be issued on 28 February 2021. B has 
made such a purchase to comply with its emission obligations in the current trading phase. Under 
the EU ETS, future issued allowances are not forbidden to be used to cover emissions in the 
current trading phase. However, such a practice is not allowed in some other emission trading 
schemes, such as in California, due to the concern that the market price for allowances in the 
current trading phase can drop due to decreased scarcity. The EU ETS may adopt the approach of 
other emission trading schemes before 2021. Article 29a of Directive 2009/29/EC amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC states that it is the intention of the EU ETS legislators to control market 
scarcity of allowances, so as to regulate price fluctuation. If this measure is adopted and future 
issued allowances will be prevented from complying with emission obligations in a current trading 
phase, issues may arise in relation to forward sale contracts of allowances between A and B. 
                                                      
115    Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 12(3). 
116    Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 3. 
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D Significance of Policy Objective of the Directive to Trading Allowances 
The significance of the EU ETS legislation in the EU emission trading market can be reflected by 
the way trading parties define terms in their contracts. The phraseology of the EU ETS legislation 
is commonly used in definitions hand in a contract for the sale of allowances. In such a core, 
interpretation of the EU ETS legislation would be needed in the judicial resolution of a contractual 
dispute. Shanning International Ltd v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc117established rules of purposive or 
teleological construction for the interpretation of the EU ETS legislations. It means that the recitals 
to the EU ETS legislation, which iterate the policy objectives of the EU ETS, should also be 
considered. The EU ETS was established to serve climate policy. The carbon market of the EU 
ETS is thus regulated in a way consistent with the objective of such climate policy: to promote the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner. This 
policy objective can be used to fill in the gaps in the legal rules of the ETS and to drive changes in 
the legal rules of the ETS. 
One of the gaps in the legal rules of the ETS is related to the timing of an allowance in a 
compliance cycle. It can cause difficulties to identify the validity of an allowance in relation to 
their timing in a compliance cycle. In each year of a trading period, new allowances are issued no 
later than 28 February, but 30 April is the latest date that allowances of the previous year should be 
surrendered corresponding to emissions of that previous year. The cancellation date is 30 June. On 
1 May of the first year of a new trading phase, allowances that have not been surrendered, or which 
have been surrendered but have not yet been cancelled, should be treated as invalid for the new 
trading phase, and should be cancelled and replaced with the same quantity of allowances within 
10 working days. Between 28 February and 30 April in any year of a trading phase, and between 
30 April and 30 June in each year of a trading phase, before cancellation of remaining allowances 
from the previous trading phase in the first year of a new trading phase, allowances that should 
have been surrendered, or should have been cancelled, are still held in a holding account and 
constitute prima facie evidence that the holder has legal title to them. But holdings of those 
allowances cannot reflect the legal rights and obligations that they have already incurred. Newly 
issued allowances that have the legal entitlements to emissions, allowances that should have been 
surrendered and whose legal entitlements should have diminished all appear as digital numbers in 
an account. The validity and consequence of trading those allowances that should have been 
surrendered but have not, that will be issued to replace remaining allowances that are no longer 
                                                      
117    [2001] UKHL 31; [2001] 1 WLR 1462. 
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valid for the new trading period, that have been surrendered but not cancelled, and that have 
become invalid but have not been cancelled, can be difficult to identify. 
As previously discussed, rules of surrendering and cancelling allowances, and rules of banking and 
borrowing allowances, have created a grey area for the validity of allowances that should have 
been surrendered but have not, that will be issued to replace remaining allowances in the trading 
period 2 and 3, that have been surrendered but have not been cancelled, and that have remained 
from the last trading period but have not been cancelled. However, as defined in Article 3 of the 
Directive 2003, an allowance is “to emit one tone of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified 
period, which shall be valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of this Directive and 
shall be transferable in accordance with the provisions of this Directive”. “The requirements of this 
Directive” and “the provisions of this Directive” are the legal rules that create and regulate legal 
rights and obligations based on allowances. A valid allowance means that legal rights and 
obligations based on an allowance are valid and “shall be transferrable”. Transfer of an allowance 
that is not valid will not result in the transferee receiving the legal rights and obligations that 
normally affect an allowance. This would be a deal-breaker in a contract of allowances sales. 
However, by reference to the definition, it can be concluded that allowances that should have been 
surrendered, but have not been, are valid, allowances that have been surrendered but have not been 
cancelled are not valid, allowances that will be issued in equivalent to replace unused allowances 
in the trading periods 2 and 3 are valid, and remaining allowances from the previous trading period 
that have not been cancelled are not valid. 
A valid allowance must first be an allowance that has not passed the trading period to which it 
was issued; second, it must serve “the purposes of meeting the requirements of the Directive”.118 
The purposes are stated in Article 1 of the Directive 2003, namely, “to promote reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”.119 This is the 
policy objective that the EU ETS serves. So, when legal rules are absent as to the validity of an 
allowance, i.e. whether or not it exactly meets the requirements of the EU ETS, the policy 
objective of promoting cost-effective and economic efficient reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions comes in as a fundamental standard by which the validity of the allowances is assessed. 
                                                      
118   Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading within the Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, art 3. 
119   Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
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The following is an assessment of different kinds of allowances in relation to their timing in a 
compliance cycle. 
There is no doubt that an allowance that was issued into the first trading phase (2005–2007) was 
not valid, when it was unused till the second trading phase (2008–2012), because it had passed the 
trading period. And the legal rule expressed that it must be cancelled.120 Moreover, the European 
Commission confirmed that a “sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was 
due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be ‘banked’ for use in the second trading 
period”.121 Before 1 May 2008, allowances that remained unused between 2005 and 2007 and 
were waiting for cancellation would be invalid. 
An allowance that was issued into the second trading phase (2008–2012) and remained unused, or 
an allowance that was issued into the third trading period (2013–2020) and will be remained 
unused, would be cancelled and replaced with another allowance. The cancellation date of 
the unused allowance is 1 May of the first year of the new trading period. The allowance that was 
awaiting cancellation, although would be soon replaced with an equivalent thing, 122 should be 
invalid. The reason is that if such an allowance is traded before 1 May, and its replacement is 
issued later, there would be two allowances for one metric tonne of carbon dioxide, which would 
not follow the policy goal of “cost-effectiveness” and “economic efficiency”. 
For the same reason, an allowance that has been surrendered but has not yet been cancelled is not 
valid either. If a surrendered allowance were to be traded again, it would become the same 
allowance that may be used for two tonnes of carbon dioxide, which also would not be a cost- 
effective or economically efficient way to combat climate change. 
However, an allowance that should have been surrendered, but which has not been, is still valid. If 
an installation chooses an alternative than surrendering allowances, such as paying a penalty for its 
emissions, chances are that surrendering allowances is not cost-effective or economically efficient 
at the time. Since the second trading phase, allowances that have not been used can be replaced 
with an equal number of allowances for the new trading phase. So, if the costs to comply with 
emission obligations were relatively cheap at the moment, consequently, allowances would also be 
cheap. An installation might choose to “bank” allowances for the future, as it predicted that the 
                                                      
120    Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L386/1, art 11(1) and (2), art 52, art 54 
and art 60(a). 
121   “Questions and Answers on the revised EU Emissions Trading System”, MEMO/08/796 (17 December 2008) 23. 
122     Every allowance is the same: a digital number that represents one metric tone of carbon dioxide. 
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costs to comply with emission obligations will become expensive, hence making the allowances 
more valuable later. This might serve the purpose of cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency, 
but it might also be counteractive to combating climate change. 
These banked allowances would only be valid for the current trading period. When the next trading 
period arrives, the banked allowances must be cancelled and replaced with new allowances to 
become valid banked allowances again. As a result, the new trading period would have more 
allowances on the market. Banking allowances have been considered a contribution to low 
allowance price, 123  hence cost-effectiveness. But a surplus in allowances might lead the 
installations to use allowances rather than investing in low-carbon technology.124 Yet, in the policy 
objective of the EU ETS, stimulation of low-carbon technology is considered a key to combating 
climate change in the long term. 
Apart from being able to fill the gap in the legal rules of the ETS, the policy objective can drive 
changes in the legal rules. What is a cost-effective and economically efficient way to combat 
climate change is evaluated over time, hence the amendments of the legal rules in response.  As the 
policy deals with climate change as a long-term issue, taking into account economic ups and 
downs, the regulations will change the goal in emission reductions over time. On the premise of 
cost-effective and efficient mitigation of climate change, the regulations of the EU carbon market 
will adjust to influence supply and demand of the emission market. Consequently, the number of 
allowances that are accessible to an emission-trading participant, how they can be accessed, and at 
what price they are accessible, are highly influenced by the regulations. The regulations affect the 
legal rights and obligations of the carbon-market participants in relation to emissions and 
subsequently affect market transactions. Following are a few examples. 
First, as the emission reduction target increases, the “cap” becomes stricter. 125  Increasing the 
emission target decreases the quantity of allowances that can be allocated to an installation. The 
total quantity of allowances is increased by Article 9 of Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 
2003/87/EC.126 And Article 9 also foretells that further changes will be made to the availability of 
allowances. 127  The quantity of allowances was lowered in 2014, 2015 and 2016 to reduce 
                                                      
123    “The EU greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme” in Edwin Woerdman, Martha Roggenkamp and Marijn    
          Holwerda (eds), Essential EU Climate Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 69. 
124      Ibid, 70. 
125      Ibid, 71. 
126     The quantity of allowances issued each year starting in 2013 shall decrease in a linear manner beginning from     
         the mid- point of the period from 2008 to 2012. The quantity shall decrease by a linear factor of 1.74 per cent. 
127     The Commission shall review the linear factor and submit a proposal, where appropriate, to the European    
          Parliament and to the Council as from 2020, with a view to the adoption of a decision by 2025 
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allowance supply and raise the price. It will be increased again in 2019 and in 2020, to increase 
supply and reduce the price.128 In respect of the changing quantity of allowances, the amending 
Directive 2009 inserts Article 9a to adjust the legal obligations of an installation, which gives rise 
to its entitlement to legal rights based on allowances. 
Second, the free allocation of large percentage of allowances in the first and second trading phase 
is changed. In the current third trading phase, 57 per cent of the total amount of allowances will be 
auctioned, while the remaining allowances are available for free allocation. Different types of 
installations are also affected differently by the allocation of allowances. At the beginning of the 
third trading period, the manufacturing industry received 80 per cent of its allowances for free. The 
quantity of allowances it can receive for free will decrease annually to 30 per cent in 2020. Since 
2013, power plants have had to buy allowances. Airlines can receive the large proportion of their 
allowances for free in the period 2013–2020. Installations in these types of industries will be 
subject to different legal rights and obligations, in respect of monitoring, reporting and the 
verification of emissions. The legal rights and obligations of the industries in relation to emissions 
affect the quantity of allowances that will be surrendered, they can have for sales and that can be 
banked and borrowed, and that will consequently affect price.  
The policy objective of the Directive is the fundamental base on which all the regulations of the 
EU carbon market have been established and changed. The regulations affect the value of 
allowances as legal entitlements to emissions. The regulations also established a system for the 
transfer of allowances during their compliance cycles, and the control of market supply and 
demand of allowances. Based on the policy objective, market oversights develop and further affect 
transactions within the EU carbon market. 
E Market Oversight of the EU Carbon Market 
Legal rules of the EU ETS regulate market supply and demand and govern the legal aspects of the 
issuance and transfer of carbon credits. However, both legal loopholes in the EU ETS and unique 
features of allowances give rise to opportunities for market manipulation and exploitative 
activities.129 To improve market certainty, market oversight has been developed in parallel to the 
EU ETS legislation. Those sales of allowances that have generated issues relating to the validity, 
quantity, legal entitlements, legal title, transfer, or price of the allowances been bought and sold 
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require reference to be made to the EU ETS legislation. Those sale of allowances that have 
involved issues regarding the conduct of the contracting parties require reference to be made to 
market-oversight. 
1  Two Types of Market Uncertainty and their Causes and Consequences 
The fairness and legality of trading activities are major concerns for most markets. The same is 
true for the carbon market. Legal loopholes can exist in accounting and taxation in relation to EU 
carbon-credit transactions. Accounting and taxation issues in trading intangible assets are 
significantly affected by the legal definition of such assets. Member States under the EU ETS have 
different laws or different legal interpretations regarding the legal definition of carbon credits that 
are intangible assets.130 
Consequently, no uniform rules of accounting and taxation of carbon credits exist under the EU 
ETS, while sales of carbon credits are made among emission trading participants in Member States 
under the EU ETS. Relevant laws of the EU ETS provide general outlines of what the holder of a 
carbon credit is entitled to do. The entitlements of the holder based on a carbon credit is a mix of 
the legal rights provided by the ETS and other rights that depend on the legal system of the 
Member State under whose registry account the relevant carbon credit are held. It has been argued 
that carbon credits are currency, like instruments.131 In one case it has been identified that a carbon 
credit has attributes of property.132 Comparatively, in California, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative Model Rule clearly defines that a carbon credit does not constitute property or a property 
right. The Member States in the EU ETS treat carbon credits differently in respect of their legal 
nature, and the EU ETS Directive does not define the nature of an allowance or other types of 
carbon credits. 
Internationally, no uniform standard is established for accounting and the taxing of carbon credits. 
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants in 2010 conducted a survey of large firms 
participating in the EU ETS. It was revealed that most of those large-firm participants treated 
carbon credits as intangible assets, because they are separable and arise from contractual and legal 
rights. 133 Occasionally, carbon credits are recorded as inventories 134  on the balance sheet of 
                                                      
130     Ibid. 
131    Jillian Button, “Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on the 
Currency Model” (2008) 32 The Harvard Environmental Law Review 571, 596. 
132    Armstrong DLW GMBH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC (Ch) 10. 
133    Heather Lovell, Thereza Sales de Aguiar, Jan Bebbington and Carlos Larrinaga-Gonzalez, “Accounting for 
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companies. Generally, carbon credits, such as allowances, that were allocated free were accounted 
by companies as having “nil value”.135 Costs of obligation to surrender carbon credits are measured 
by comparison between carrying value of carbon credits that were received or purchased and the 
market value of carbon credits that still need to be purchased to cover actual emissions.136 
Due to the different treatment of accounting and taxation on carbon credits in different Member 
States, tax law regarding carbon credits varies across the legal systems of national states. A 
company can pay taxes in more than one jurisdiction and would have difficulties deciding which 
tax rules it should follow. The choice of tax rules is negotiated between the contracting parties in 
the sale of allowances. Liabilities and risks in issues relating to accounting and taxation are often 
allocated through contractual terms. However, performance of those contractual terms may give 
rise to disputes due to new situations arising from new regulations in tax and accounting. For 
example, events of VAT fraud gave rise to new regulations, which has changed the way in which 
contracting parties allocate liabilities and risks in the accounting and taxation of allowances. 
On the other hand, VAT fraud, also known as carousel fraud, can occur because tax rules for 
carbon credits under the EU ETS are different among the Member States.137 This type of tax fraud 
can usually be found in the sale of commodities that have high value, low bulk per unit, and which 
are easily transportable in large quantities,138 all of which are features of carbon credits. Carbon 
credits have high price, exist only as a digital number recorded in a registry system, and are 
transferred electronically and instantly. In the sale of carbon credits, trading participants can 
commit this type of fraud by taking advantage of buying allowances in countries that do not charge 
VAT and then selling them in countries that do. Sellers collect VAT on behalf of the buyer, and 
buyers are reimbursed when they sell the carbon credits again.139 Legal reforms of VAT first at the 
national level and then at the EU level impose obligations on the emission-trading participants.140 
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Now the common solution to VAT fraud across the EU is “reverse charging”, by which all traders 
are required to account for VAT on carbon credits at the time of purchase.141 
Theft is another type of criminal activity on carbon credits. In 2011, criminals hacked the registries 
of Austria and the Czech Republic, and two million European Union Allowances worth 30 million 
euros were stolen.142 
Fairness in the sale of EU carbon credits may be challenged by the imbalance of power existing 
between large companies,143 big banks and financial institutions,144 and small installations 145 in 
their access to carbon credits at the market price. Large companies who are significant emitters are 
able to purchase and hold a large proportion of carbon credits that are in circulation. Banks and 
financial institutions are able to accrue large volumes of carbon credits as well. When large 
companies, banks and financial institutions hold significantly large quantity of carbon credits, 
small installations may experience a shortage of carbon credits on the market, and the market price 
of carbon credits may inflate.146 Large companies, banks and financial institutions can sell carbon 
credits at a high price.  
The market for trading carbon credits is thus prone to criminal activity and unfairness. The 
contract of market participants in trading carbon credits can provide terms that cater for uncertain 
events that might be caused by criminal activity and unfair trading. However, the occurrence of 
contractual uncertainties that may be caused by criminal activity and unfair trading can be reduced 
when market-oversight measures bring some order to the carbon market. 
On the other hand, market oversight also imposes obligations on market participants. The legal 
rules of the EU carbon market are a source of the legal obligations of the market participants. The 
behaviour of market participants is legislated in areas of registry account registration and tracking 
processes, IT security of the registry systems and accounts, taxation and accounting rules in 
relation to the carbon credits, standardization of “Know Your Customer” procedures in carbon-
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credit sales, and  fair access to carbon credits and market information.147 Market oversight also 
grants certain authoritative power to intervene in market activities, especially through auctioning 
and transaction process to control the buying up of the supply of carbon credits. Market 
participants in a carbon- credit sale allocate the burden of complying with their legal obligations 
imposed by market oversight through contracts, or they prepare for contractual performance that 
may be affected by authoritative interventions.148 
2  Subsequent Changes in Legal Rules of the Carbon Market 
To deal with VAT fraud, theft of carbon credits, market manipulation and issues related to the 
trading of carbon credits on the financial market, market oversight of emission trading has 
developed and been implemented. 
Directive 2010/23/EU revised the VAT Directive 2006/112/EC to regulate buyers’ responsibilities 
for the payment of VAT on allowance transactions. The evasion of taxes on EU ETS allowances 
can have severe consequences and be considered a crime.149 Liabilities and risks related to VAT in 
the sale of carbon credits should now shift to the buyers. 
Revised legal rules of the carbon market also include legal rules of the Commission Regulation 
regarding tracking processes in relation to the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of carbon 
credits in the registry system. The objective of the Commission Regulation is stated as being “to 
ensure no transfers incompatible with the obligations resulting from Directive 2003/87/EC, the 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Kyoto Protocol) 
and Decision No 406/2009/EC”. 150  Although sales of carbon credits are not recorded by the 
Registry System, the physical delivery of allowances as a result of sales is recorded by the registry. 
Tracking of the issuance, holding and cancellation of carbon credits is a function of the registry 
and accessible to the public. It assists buyers to acquire information about the carbon credits they 
will receive. 
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The amended Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013151 made a significant change. Opening 
accounts now must meet certain legal requirements. This was not included in the previous versions 
of the Commission Regulation. Those legal requirements vary depending on whether the opened 
accounts are national administrative platform accounts, auction delivery accounts, operator holding 
accounts, person holding and trading accounts, external trading platform accounts, or verifier 
accounts in the Union Registry.152 Identities of account holders must be registered in detail and are 
accessible to the public. This change affords no excuse to transferees who do not check the identity 
of holders of accounts from which the carbon credits are transferred. The transferees are also able 
to ensure that legal title to the carbon credits they are about to receive is not defective. For 
example, conducting “Know Your Customer” procedures may be considered a conduct of due 
diligence on the part of the transferees.153 Whether the transferees have conducted “Know Your 
Customer”, procedures may evidence whether they have acted in good faith. The test of “good 
faith” in the receipt of carbon credits, the legal title of which has become defective, is needed to 
decide whether the transferee can acquire the legal title to the transferred carbon credits.154 
F Conclusion 
This chapter has presented regulations of the EU carbon market relevant to the performance of 
contracts for the sale of carbon credits. The relevant regulations include regulations that give 
definition, validity and tradability to carbon credits, that monitor the transfer of carbon credits 
within the Registry System, and that oversee the conduct of market participants. The regulations 
are also relevant in creating a context where the commercial purpose in the sale of EU carbon 
credits can be ascertained. The regulatory governance and its changes can disrupt contractual 
performance in the sale of carbon credits. This chapter is necessary in informing the relevance of 
the EU regulations in the contract construction exercise, that is, in cases of disputed performance 
in the sale or purchase of EU carbon credits. 
Fundamental performance obligations under a contract for the sale of carbon credits include the 
delivery and acceptance of carbon credits as agreed in the contract. The contractual terms provide 
a definition of the carbon credits that are to be delivered and accepted, as well as prescribing the 
time, place and process of delivery and acceptance and the duties that contracting parties are 
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expected to undertake for a smooth transaction. Words and phrases used in these provisions can 
mirror directly the language of the regulations. The performance of these terms can be affected by 
changes in the regulations. When disputes arise from contractual performance in the sale or 
purchase of EU carbon credits, the regulations of the EU carbon market must inevitably be 
consented and addressed in contractual construction exercises. 
The next chapter will introduce standard commercial practice of EU carbon market participants in 
making contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits. It will show that contract-making in carbon- 
credit sales is influenced significantly by the regulations of the EU carbon market. Standardized 
contracts within that market will be used as examples to show typical expressions of contracting 





The Standard Contracts for Carbon-Credit 
Sales 
This chapter will first introduce the historical background and development of contract-making in 
the sale of carbon credits, before turning to the two most common ways of trading on the EU 
carbon market: stock exchanges and Over-the-Counter (“OTC”). The trading agreements that 
market participants may use for carbon-credit transactions on stock exchanges and OTC will then 
be discussed. The International Emission Trading Master Agreement (“IETMA”) will be the 
example used in this chapter to illustrate the role of the regulations of the EU carbon market play 
the role of in informing market participants when entering into contracts for the sale of EU carbon 
credits. 
To date, carbon credits under the EU ETS are mainly sold via OTC and the stock exchanges.155 
Carbon-credit transactions that take place OTC can be governed in one single trading agreement, 
which is commonly called a “master agreement”. A typical example of such a master agreement is 
the IETMA provided by the International Emission Trading Association (“IETA”). Carbon-credit 
transactions on stock exchanges must be governed by contracts provided by platforms of the stock 
exchanges. Market participants on the EU carbon market via OTC and stock exchanges not only 
include financial speculators, but also operators who need carbon credits to comply with emission 
obligations under the EU ETS.156 The development of contractual approaches to the sale of EU 
carbon credits OTC and through stock exchanges is due to the high risks of trading on the carbon 
market. 
However, such contractual approaches are similar to general sale and purchase agreements. They 
all include terms relating to delivery and payments, representations and warranties, events of 
default, remedies and termination. The distinctive feature of carbon-credit sales, as this chapter 
will discuss, is that activities required to be performed can be governed by the regulations of the 
EU carbon market. For example, delivery and acceptance of carbon credits require use of the EU 
                                                      
155    Nathalie Berta, Emmanuelle Gautherat and Ozgur Gun, ‘Transactions in the European carbon market: a bubble 
of compliance in a whirlpool of speculation’ (2017) 41 Cambridge Journal of Economics 575. 
156    Martijn Wilder and Paul Curnow, ‘Trading Carbon as a Commodity: Sale and Purchase Agreements for 
Carbon Credits’ (2005) Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Yearbook 351, 367. 
 
 60 
registry system. The activities of using the EU registry system are governed by the relevant EU 
regulations. 
A A Brief History of Contracting for the Sale of Carbon Credits 
In carbon-credit sales, the definition, validity and tradability of carbon credits are provided by 
regulations of the EU carbon market. The process of transferring carbon credits is monitored by 
the regulations. Market participants must follow regulations of issuance, holding, use and transfer 
of carbon credits. 
As was pointed out in Chapter Three, EUAs and CERs are the two main types of carbon credits 
that the EU ETS regulates as legal entitlements to comply with emission-reduction obligations. 
Both an EUA and a CER represent one tone of carbon dioxide and are generally referred to as an 
“Allowance” in the IETMA — an agreement that trading parties can use to contract for both EUAs 
and CERs. However, contracting for the sale of EUAs and CERs has gone through different 
pathways, because different contractual issues may arise due to the different legal regulations 
involved. 
The quantity of and the time when CERs can be issued depends on approval of project 
methodology, registration of the project, and verification of emission reductions resulting from 
project activities. These factors are governed by rules of the CDM. CDM projects require several 
years of development. Different interests can be involved in the project development. For 
example, participation of project developers, financiers, project owners, other project participants, 
local communities, and host countries in the projects. Each party may claim its share of interests 
in the project activities to be paid in the form of carbon credits. 
Allowances are issued based on allocation. No project development needs to be done before the 
issuance of allowances. Buyers and sellers can enter into contracts for the direct and immediate 
sale of a fixed amount of allowances. In contrast, the parties to contracts for the sale of CERs that 
have not been generated from projects must plan for deliveries that may happen years into the 
future. Also, under the EU ETS, the sale of CERs that have not been issued may involve EU 
buyers and sellers from non-EU countries, because projects from which the CERs are generated 
may be located in countries beyond EU, as they generally are. Contracting for the sale of CERs 
has experienced a more diverse development with a variety of structures, from the early stage of 
making the sale contract for emission reductions without the existence of a legal framework that 
underpins the creation and transfer of CERs, to the middle stage of making forward sales of CERs 
that would be generated in the future, and up to the date when spot transactions of CERs that have 
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happened more and more often due to the increasing amount of CERs that have been generated 
and which are available for instant sale. The greater the number of CERs available for instant sale, 
the more liquidity the market has. In instant sale where CERs are available, contractual issues 
with project development are no longer a concern. Therefore, contracts for the sale of such CERs 
can use the same agreement that is used to sell and purchase EUAs. 
As the market for CERs has changed, contracting parties can use trading agreements to 
accommodate multiple sales of CERs and EUAs. On the one hand, standardized financial market- 
style agreements provide certainty so as to minimize the high risk and to increase liquidity on the 
carbon market. On the other hand, carbon credits display the same features as commodities in 
general, such as intangibility and liquidity. In many jurisdictions, they are identified as a right “sui 
generis”. 157  Participants on the EU carbon market, therefore, are able to utilize financial 
transactions as a contractual approach to the sale of carbon credits. General terms of a contract for 
the sale of carbon credits, such as warranties and representations, events of default, etc. are more 
or less the same as for general types of agreement for the sale and purchase of other commodities. 
Specific terms may be provided for liabilities and risks that are unique to emission trading. Under 
the governance of a single master agreement, the parties enter into several transactions. Each 
transaction will be subject to a specific schedule and confirmation, which provide definitions and 
terms tailored to the unique features of carbon credits in that transaction, as well as commercial 
terms on payment type, date, delivery, etc. 
1  Early Stage 
When the EU ETS began its first trading phase, legal rules of the emission trading system were at a 
very early stage of development. CERs are a type of carbon offset that was initially designed to 
comply with emission obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. They are issued in equivalence to 
emission reductions achieved through the CDM project activities, according to the CDM projects. 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international legal framework for climate change mitigation. It binds 
most developed countries with emission-reduction goals, and Member States of the EU ETS are 
also parties who undertake obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Emission-trading participants, 
including governments and non-governments, operator-type and non-operator-type traders, under 
the EU ETS are most likely buyers of CERs. On the one hand, CERs are internationally tradable 
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and can be used as legal entitlements to emissions in accordance with legal rules of the Kyoto 
Protocol. On the other hand, CERs are tradable credits that can be used as legal entitlements to 
emissions in accordance with legal rules of the EU ETS.158  However, the EU ETS started earlier 
than the Kyoto Protocol. At the very early stage of purchase of CERs on the EU carbon market, 
legal rules relating to the issuance of CERs were not yet formed. 
Meanwhile, a concept of carbon credits that can be gained from project-related activities and then 
used as rights to emit was not provided by any private law.159 For example, a contract might define 
emission reduction achieved by project activities as “all existing and future legal and beneficial 
rights arising from one greenhouse reduction, including any right, interest, credit, entitlement, 
benefit, allowance, certificate or registrable right arising from or in connection with that 
greenhouse gas reduction”.160 Risk in the early contracting phase arose from the possibility that the 
Kyoto Protocol may not enter into force.161 Consequently, the contracted “emission reduction” 
may not have any value so as to be used as a right or interest, based on recognition by a legal 
framework for the issuance and trading of carbon offsets.162 Buyers generally took the risk that 
such a legal framework may not develop and that contracted emission reductions consequently did 
not have any value. 163  Sellers usually took the risk to ensure that the contracted emission 
reductions that the projects would generate can be issued with credits if the legal framework did 
develop. 164  At that time, key EU buyers of CERs were Norway and the Netherlands. They 
developed standardized contracting approaches that used similar definitions and concepts.165 
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The World Bank carbon fund was another key player in the early stage of the purchase of emission 
reductions.166 Because it started acquiring emission reductions through ERPAs before the Kyoto 
Protocol had entered into force, a necessary term in an ERPA was that emission reductions that the 
World Bank would purchase could be converted into CERs under Article 12 of the CDM. Due to  
the absence of a name for a CER to signify the existence of an emission reduction, the World Bank 
ERPA would define its contracted objects as “Verified Emission Reductions” (“VERs”).167  VERs 
are defined as all existing and future legal and beneficial rights arising from one reduction of 
Greenhouse  Gas  (“GHG”) emission, including the right to any CERs arising from  that GHG 
reduction.168 The purpose was to identify regulatory rights that could arise from project activities in 
the uncertainty of a legal framework that may or may not create such regulatory rights. 
2  The Developing Stage: Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (“ERPA”) 
ERPAs were typically used and evolved when, later, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. An 
ERPA is defined as a specialized form of purchase and sale agreement to acquire emission 
reductions.169 In the sale of CERs that have not been generated, the buyer usually contracts with the 
project owner for the future delivery of CERs. The seller usually undertakes the risk of the failure 
to produce CERs. Due to the long-term development of CDM projects, buyers and sellers can enter 
into contracts many years before CERs start being issued. 170  The Kyoto rules regulate CDM 
project developments, verifications and certification. Terms of an ERPA involve Kyoto-specific 
terms to deal with issues of CDM project developments, verifications and certification. However, 
rights and obligations in the contractual relationship governed by a ERPA can be complicated by 
the different ways in which buyers are engaged in the project development. 
One way is that the EU buyer engages in the project development as project participant, sharing 
liabilities and risks related to project development with the project owners. ERPAs are bilaterally 
negotiated between the project owners and the EU buyers who directly receive the CERs. 
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Engagement in the project development may expose buyers to risks caused by laws of countries 
hosting the project. 
Another way can be that the EU buyers may make loans to a CDM project firm and become its 
creditor rather than getting engaged in management of the project itself. To make matters even 
more complicated, there might be foreign project participants who have engaged in the project 
development as well. For example, an EU private broker holds a portfolio of CDM projects. It 
pools funds of the EU operators to purchase CERs in a diverse range of CDM projects. The broker 
does not have to become a project participant. But the EU operators, in order to receive CERs on 
their issuances, must become a project participant, at least at the agreed time of the CERs transfer 
from the CDM registry (either from a pending account of the CDM registry or an account of the 
project owner in the CDM registry) to their account in a national registry. The ERPA is made 
between the private broker and the CDM project firm, and can be used as a bankable contract, 
while the private broker and the EU operator form another investee and investor agreement. 
Another example of using an ERPA by a financial institution is the Word Bank’s Prototype Carbon 
Fund (“PCF”).171 It pools the funds of several EU operators or Member States to purchase forward 
CERs from various CDM projects it holds through project portfolio management. The CERs 
issued later will be returned as revenues to contributors to the funds and will be distributed among 
them.172 In the beginning, the World Bank ERPAs drew experience from project finance, loans and 
credit agreements, providing up-front financing in return for rights to the future delivery of 
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emission reduction.173 The Bank adopted a “payment on delivery” approach, by which payment 
was made on the future delivery of emission reduction. 174  Still, it did not abandon “up-front 
financing” completely; some “up-front financing” continued to be offered in an ERPA. 
The World Bank later developed standardized terms, or “general conditions”, for ERPAs.175 These 
terms are transaction-specific regarding price, volume, conditions precedent, delivery schedule, 
and representations, warranties and covenants. 
When the contracting parties to an ERPAs are of the large government type, such as the 
Netherlands176 and Norway, or large financial institutions, such as the World Bank, standardized 
ERPAs have been promoted. When the contracting parties to ERPAs are medium and small 
economic entities, ERPAs remain privately negotiated contracts on an individual basis. What 
would be different between all kinds of ERPAs is the way in which the EU buyers and sellers 
allocated liabilities and risks in respect of the main contractual issues, such as the acceptance and 
delivery of CERs, as well as the value of CERs on the EU carbon market. And contracting parties 
to an ERPA are informed by the legal rules that regulate CERs transactions. 
(a) The Kyoto Rules of CERs Issuance and Delivery 
Development of the CDM projects must follow rules of implementation of the CDM,177such as the 
CDM project standard (“PS”), CDM validation and verification standard (“VVS”) and CDM 
project cycle procedure (“PCP”). Issuance of CERs based on the CDM projects must also follow a 
registration and issuance process provided in the “Marrakesh Accords”. 178 So, the issuance of 
CERs is highly regulated by legal rules of the Kyoto Protocol. The quantity of CERs agreed in an 
ERPA may be increased or decreased due to changes in the rules of project methodology, emission 
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accounting, etc, as these rules affect issuance of CERs. The long-term and highly regulated process 
of generating CERs can cause issues such as CDM projects getting blocked in the CDM project 
pipeline or failing to meet verification standards. These issues can result in the physical 
unavailability of CERs, which either gives rise to difficulties in the timely delivery of CERs or 
impossibility of delivery of CERs. The legal effects of regulatory events in the non-performance of 
delivery of CERs, which may be temporary or permanent, may be negotiated between contracting 
parties in the ERPA, or decided by applicable laws. 
(b) Value of CERs on the EU Carbon Market 
Market demand for CERs from the EU ETS is driven by the linking of the EU ETS with the Kyoto 
Protocol. It means that the value of CERs on the EU carbon market is based on the EU ETS 
legislation. It acknowledges that CERs, a type of carbon offset created under the legal rules of the 
Kyoto Protocol, can be used for the purpose of the EU ETS. However, the Directive of the EU 
ETS has set the quantity and quality requirements for CERs to be used to comply with emission 
reduction obligations in the EU ETS.179 And the quantity and quality requirements have been 
changed through every revision of the Directive 2003/87/EC. The Directive and its revisions have 
also restricted CERs from certain types of CDM projects to be used under the EU ETS. For 
example, the revised Directive has regulated that, since 2012, CERs generated from industrial gas 
projects and projects registered post-2012 from non-LDCs (Least Developing Countries), as well 
as projects involving the destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide emissions 
from adipic acid production, should not be used as legal entitlements to emissions under the EU 
ETS. Subsequent changes in the EU ETS regarding the validity of CERs have created uncertain 
factors180 in the ERPA where the buyers are from the EU ETS. The agreed CERs may have been 
generated from a type of project that later becomes ineligible due to subsequent changes in the EU 
ETS. 
Another complexity in the purchase of CERs under the EU ETS concerns to the transfer process of 
CERs. The transfer of CERs in an ERPA between an EU ETS buyer and a project owner of 
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another country involves the operation of the CDM registry and the EU registry. The CDM 
registry is established under an international trading scheme of the Kyoto Protocol, while the EU 
registry is established under rules of the EU trading scheme. To receive issuance of CERs in the 
first place, project participants who are the project owners of the hosting countries must open an 
account under the CDM registry; project participants who are the buyers must open an account 
under the EU Registry. Transfer of CERs from the CDM registry to the EU registry is then 
checked by the International Transaction Log (“ITL”) and the European Union Transaction Log 
(“EUTL”). The ITL has the mandate to check whether CERs transactions are consistent with rules 
of the Kyoto Protocol (“KP”), and also forward information to the EUTL which will check if 
CERs transactions are consistent with rules of the EU ETS. The EUTL can require the CDM 
registry and the EU registry to terminate a CERs transaction if the EUTL finds the transaction has 
violated rules of the KP or of the EU ETS. Regulatory operation of the transaction logs and the 
registry system that can result in non-performance of delivery of CERs are uncertain factors. Both 
can be negotiated around in the ERPA or may be decided by applicable laws. Also, contracting 
parties may infringe on the rules of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS in their formation and 
performance of the ERPA. 
3  The Maturing Stage: Financial Derivatives 
Sales of CERs have subsequently later on been frequently structured in the form of derivatives, 
which have been used in sales of allowances since the beginning of the EU ETS. The current EU 
ETS market mainly has two segments: the OTC market and the exchange market. Spots, swaps, 
futures and forwards are the main types of contracts on the two markets. 
Spot contracts are used in transactions where a specified quantity of allowances or CERs is agreed 
for immediate delivery or within short period after the agreement. 181  Physical delivery of 
allowances or CERs182 in the context of emission trading refers to transfer of the carbon credits 
into registry accounts. 
CERs can be used as legal entitlements to emissions under the EU ETS. The installations use 
CERs to meet emission targets by exchanging them for allowances.183 However, only eight per 
cent of the emission targets of an installation can be covered by CERs.184 For example, installation 
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A has amount of CERs that can cover more than eight per cent of its emission targets, and, of 
course, it cannot use the extra amount of CERs. And it does not have sufficient allowances to 
cover the outstanding 92 percent of allowances. Installation B does not have any CERs, but it has 
allowances. A can swap CERs for B’s allowances. 
In forwards, commercial terms such as payment and delivery are agreed before the execution date 
of the performance.185 This type of transaction is structured by what has been mentioned earlier, the 
master agreement, for example, as drafted by the IETA or ISDA. In this type of transaction, 
exposure to the risks of delivery failure is greater than under a spot or swap contract. Usually, 
forwards incorporate “call options”, especially in sales of CERs. Call options usually give the 
buyer a right but not the obligation to buy allowances or CERs that are to be delivered in the 
future.186 
Futures are similar to forwards, made for delivery of a specified quantity of carbon credits in the 
future.187 The difference between forwards and futures is that forwards are made between traders 
of OTC, while futures are made on the platform. Forwards can be standardized, however, but they 
are not as fully standardized as futures. 
In terms of being subject to a legal framework of emission trading, the difference between 
forwards on OTC and futures on the Exchange is that, since trading phase three onward, forwards 
on OTC are to be governed by the MiFID regime, while futures on the Exchange are governed by 
the MiFID regime as well as the trading rules of the Exchange market. Carbon credits are still 
transferred through a registry system in the end. This means that contracting parties are exposed to 
risks associated with market-oversight mechanisms, i.e. the conduct of contracting parties must 
meet the requirements of market oversight, as well as the legal rules of the EU registry system, i.e. 
the transfer process of carbon credits must comply with the EU ETS legislation. But, as a result of 
using financial derivatives, exposure to other kinds of risks in performance, especially price risks, 
are significantly reduced. 
B Typical Terms in Sales of Allowances and CERs 
Both allowances and CERs are kinds of generic carbon credits that represent a right to emit one 
tonne of carbon dioxide. Sales of CERs that need to be generated in the future differ from sales of 
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allowances or sales of CERs that have already been issued. Issuance of CERs can face risks in the 
development of a project, the process of emission reduction verification and monitoring, and in the 
social and legal environment of the hosting countries. These risks are unique to sales of CERs that 
have not be issued. Apart from these risks, sales of non-issued CERs, CERs that are already issued, 
and allowances share key contractual terms in common: (1) the definition of what is sold; (2) who 
is entitled to what is sold; (3) the seller’s rights to transfer allowances or CERs; (4) the payment 
date before or after the transfer of allowances or CERs; and (5) the quantity of delivery. Examples 
of these terms will be selected from two model contracts, including an ERPA, which is a contract 
for the sale of CERs that have not yet been issued, and a Master Agreement, which is a contract for 
the sale of allowances or CERs that have been issued. 
C Model Contracts 
Model contracts refer to those selected from contracting experiences of leading economic actors on 
the EU carbon market, for example, contracting experiences of the World Bank, the Netherlands 
and Norway. Such contracts inform common commercial purposes, anticipations and concerns, as 
well as conduct of market participants in the sale of EU carbon credits. 
Contracting parties can use the regulations of the EU carbon market as a source of knowledge to 
negotiate terms that provide: 
(1) definition, validity and legality of the agreed carbon credits; 
(2) actions that must be taken to result in successful transfer; and 
(3) conduct that may offend the legislation. 
When disputes arise from these terms, the regulations of the EU carbon market can be relevant in 
the contract interpretation exercise. 
Take one model contract, the IETMA, for example. It governs one or more transactions.188 For a 
transaction under the EU ETS, it must be read with Schedule 4 of the EU ETS System Schedule. 
Terms in the IETMA address the liabilities for a breach of contract where the regulations of the EU 
carbon market give rise to impossibility or difficulties in relation to performance. For example, a 
subsequent change in the regulations of the EU carbon market can give rise to issues with the 
Registry System, the International Transactional Log and EU Transaction Log, which causes 
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failure in the performance of transfer or acceptance obligations. If the arising event is (1) absence 
of Registry Operation, or (2) the occurrence of an Administrator event, which leads to the failure 
of transfer, it is governed by the Suspension Event clause.189 
Subsequent changes in the regulations can also cause the performance of a transaction to be 
unlawful or render its purpose non-existent. For example, certain amendments to the Directive 
2003/87/EC and the EU Registry regulation can disqualify the use of CERs from certain CDM 
projects for compliance purposes and can prevent such CERs from emission trading in the EU 
ETS. Clause 14.7, Illegality, in the main text of the Master Agreement, provides for performance 
being rendered unlawful due to subsequent changes in the law. And clause 14.8 further provides 
that “If an event or circumstance that would otherwise constitute or give rise to Force Majeure also 
constitutes an Illegality, it is to be treated as an Illegality and does not constitute Force 
Majeure.”190 So, although subsequent changes in regulations of EU ETS that frustrate the purpose 
of performance of the contract can be interpreted as a force majeure event, it will still be treated as 
an illegality. But the problem is whether it is a force majeure event or an illegality event when 
changes in regulations of the EU ETS invalidate the value of contracted CERs to be used on the 
EU ETS. Whether such events render the performance of the CERs transaction unlawful, or merely 
frustrate the commercial purpose of the performance, is open to judicial interpretation and 
treatment. 
The IETMA defines a force majeure event as one that is beyond control of the contracting parties 
and which cannot be overcome with reasonable effort, which causes non-performance in the 
delivery and acceptance of CERs.191 The failure of a CERs transfer caused by regulations of the 
EU ETS can also be caused by a suspension event, which is (1) the absence of Registry Operation, 
or (2) the occurrence of an Administrator event that causes failure of a CERs transfer.192 It is not 
defined by the contract whether events other than these two arising from a subsequent change in 
rules of the EU carbon market can constitute a force majeure event. For example, subsequent 
changes in the rules of the CDM procedures and modalities that can cause failure of the CDM 
project, subsequently, CERs cannot be delivered on time due to physical unavailability. By 
reference to the force majeure clause of the IETMA, whether physical unavailability of CERs due 
to subsequent changes in the regulations is a force majeure event is open to interpretation. The 
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definition of force majeure in the main text of the Master Agreement provides a few ingredients of 
a force majeure event, including: 
(1) the occurrence of any event or circumstance that cannot be controlled by the FM 
Affected Party; 
(2) the occurrence of any event or circumstance could not be overcome after the FM 
Affected Party using all reasonable efforts; and 
(3) the FM Affected Party, which can be a Delivering Party or a Receiving Party, is therefore 
incapable of delivering the Period Traded Allowances from any Holding Account in any 
Registry (or if one or more Delivering Party's Holding Accounts are specified) or accept 
the Period Traded Allowances into the Receiving Party's Holding Account(s), in 
accordance with the Trading System.193 
The definition of force majeure excludes two events, which result in the affected party having 
insufficient period traded allowances in the relevant holding account, as force majeure events: 
(1) the low or non-allocation of allowances under a trading system; and 
(2) the failure of that party to procure sufficient allowances to meet its delivery obligations.194 
However, it is also provided that “this is not an exhaustive list of events which will not constitute a 
Force Majeure and is provided for the avoidance of doubt only”. 195 This definition does not 
specify whether an event of insufficient amount of carbon credits arising from a subsequent 
change in the regulations of the EU carbon market is a force majeure event. Although a 
subsequent change in the regulations that causes physical unavailability of carbon credits may be 
considered an uncontrollable event, the concept of “reasonable effort” and “impossibility of 
delivery” awaits interpretation. 
Also, if the delivered carbon credits are allowances that come from allocation rather than specific 
CDM projects or can be replaceable by other allowances procured from the market, a subsequent 
change in the regulations that causes physical unavailability of carbon credits may not be 
considered a force majeure event. So, upon a subsequent change in the regulations, which cause 
the contracted carbon credits to become physically unavailable for delivery, the promisor may 
claim for its non-performance on the ground of force majeure, while the promisee may claim the 
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non-performance of the promisor as an event of default on the ground that the promisor’s ability to 
perform has been impaired by material adverse change.196 
However, the IETMA provides an apparent solution to an event that may be considered a force 
majeure, an event of default and a suspension event at the same time. “Where an event or 
circumstance that would otherwise constitute or give rise to an Event of Default also constitutes a 
Force Majeure or Suspension Event, it is to be treated as a Force Majeure or Suspension Event and 
not as an Event of Default.”197 Again, the definition of a force majeure, suspension event and an 
event of default in the IETMA awaits interpretation. 
First, the IETMA designates English law as the applicable law of the contract, and so the 
formation, performance and interpretation of the parties’ obligation is to be governed by that law. 
Under English law, an event subsequent to the formation of the contract that is beyond the control 
of the contracting parties, and not self-induced, rendering the performance of the contract 
impossible, or at least radically different from that contemplated under the contract, is dealt with 
under the doctrine of frustration.198 And this kind of event is named as a supervening event. A 
subsequent change in the regulations, which results in failure of contractual performance, if not 
prescribed by the contract, may be interpreted as a supervening event. The doctrine of frustration 
may be invoked, and the contract will automatically end, and the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943 (UK) may apply to adjust the rights of the parties after discharge. 
Similar to supervening events, suspension events and illegality events are also caused by factors 
outside the control of the contracting parties, are unforeseeable and are subsequent to the formation 
of the contract. However, by providing for them in the clauses relating to suspension events and 
illegality in the contract, the contracting parties express the intention that suspension events and 
illegality events shall not be treated as supervening events and shall not invoke the doctrine of 
frustration. 
The suspension event clause provides that for the duration of the suspension event, the full 
obligations of both parties will be suspended, but they will be resume after the suspension event 
ceases. By this clause, the defaulting party is given a period of time where it is relieved from 
liabilities for non- performance. If the full obligations of both parties can be resumed within a 
certain period of time, the performance will be treated as a delayed performance; performance cost 
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will be adjusted accordingly, but the promisor does not have to pay damages for the delayed 
performance. But if the suspension even exceeds the Long Stop Date,199 it will be terminated with 
“no termination payment”,200 which is the application of the Clause 13.2(a).201 
The illegality clause provides that contracting parties can agree otherwise than terminating the 
contract. This research has found that this is contrary to the regulations of registry systems in the 
Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS. According to the regulations, the ITL and the EUTL can require 
the CDM registry or the EU registry to terminate carbon-credit transactions that are found to be 
inconsistent with rules of the Kyoto Protocol and the relevant trading system. The clause fails to 
provide for whether the contracting parties are able to terminate the contract. Consequently, 
liabilities of the defaulting parties and the legal effect of non-performance due to the conduct of 
the Registry system may generate legal disputes. 
So, some reflection can be made on the way in which the IETMA addresses the relevance of the 
regulations in the sale of EU carbon credits. The force majeure clause lists a number of non- 
exhaustive events.202 It provides for the suspension of the obligations of both parties during the 
duration of the force majeure event.203 Full performance of the parties’ obligations will resume 
after the force majeure event ceases to operate. If the force majeure event continues either for 
“nine Delivery Banking Days”,204 or as the parties here agreed in Schedule 4 of the IETMA, either 
party may elect for termination. Upon termination, the contract will be discharged, and the 
contracting parties can elect a form of termination payment from Clause 13.2(a), (b) and (c) in the 
main master agreement of the IETMA. 
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However, by non-exhaustive listing, the contract opens a window for the promisee to claim that in 
its reasonable and good-faith opinion, the promisor is no longer able to perform its obligations, 
because its ability has been impaired by certain events, and a material adverse change has 
occurred. Although the promisor may seek to be excused from its non-performance and argue for 
such an event to fall within the category of force majeure event, there is after all much room for 
judicial interpretation using default rules, and uncertainty arises. 
Also, the standardized force majeure clause, by not providing an exhaustive list of events, attempts 
to restrict an event that can fit into its description of a force majeure event, and which is not a 
suspension event, an illegality, or an event of default, from invoking doctrine of frustration. 
However, an event may not meet these criteria set by the force majeure clause to be claimed as a 
force majeure event or lead to the legal consequences provided by the clause. In fact, it is argued in 
this thesis that the standardized force majeure clause affords an opportunity for an event to be 
treated as having the legal effect of a supervening event that invokes the doctrine of frustration. 
The regulations of the EU ETS can give rise to an event that can be interpreted as a force majeure 
event, a suspension event, an illegality event, an event of default, or a frustrating event. The 
regulations will be involved in contract interpretation. 
D Conclusion 
Participants in the EU carbon market usually use a written, standard-form master agreement to 
govern multiple transactions of carbon credits OTC. The Master Agreement acts as an umbrella 
agreement and its terms apply to each transaction. However, each transaction may have its 
individually negotiated terms relating to quantity, price and types of carbon credits, as well as the 
accounts to deliver and to receive the contracted-for carbon credits. These individually negotiated 
terms will be stated in confirmation letters for each transaction. 
The “umbrella” agreement may be used without negotiation or the signatures of the trading parties 
in each transaction. A confirmation letter will be used simply to confirm the amount of carbon 
credits that are delivered, and when payment is made. Issues of contract interpretation can arise in 
the resolution of contractual disputes. Issues of incorporation of a term might arise, for example, in 
relation to a term that excludes obligations of the contracting parties, or holds the contracting 
parties to their obligations, when trading circumstances have been changed by the EU ETS 
regulations. The parties who end up bearing the obligations may claim that this term should not be 
incorporated for some reason, such as that they were unaware of the existence of the term, or of the 
onerousness of the term. 
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Disputes may still arise as to whether the term correctly states the intentions of the contracting 
parties. For example, A agreed to buy carbon credits generated from B’s project. The parties then 
estimated and agreed the amount of carbon credits to be delivered. They also agreed that if changes 
in the accounting mechanism occur and increase or decrease the amount of carbon credits, the 
seller should deliver, and the buyer should accept the new amount of carbon credits. A fresh 
accounting mechanism is developed afterwards, which doubles the amount of carbon credits that 
actually are generated. It may be disputed as to whether the parties would actually intend to 
contract on the amount of carbon credits that became twice the estimated amount. It is similar to 
some contracts in the 19th century, where, regardless of the inclusion of a war clause in the 
relevant contract, World War I was still considered beyond the kind of normal military event that 
the contracting parties would have reasonably contemplated at the time of contract formation. The 
commerciality of the businessmen would have made them turn away from entering into a trading 
relationship if they had known that World War I, not a normal kind of war, would occur. In 
contracts for the sale of carbon credits, contract construction is needed to determine whether it 
would be commercial common sense to agree to buy and sell the amount of carbon credits that 
turns out to be a little more or a little less than the agreed amount. 
The next chapter will discuss how the courts may interpret disputed terms in a contract for the sale 
of EU carbon credits and address the relevant EU regulations that govern the transactional 
activities needed to perform the contractual terms. The approach that the court would take to 
defining “commercial common sense” influences the interpretation of the nature and legal effect of 





The Role of Regulations in Contract 
Interpretation: A Case Study of an Alleged 
Breach of the “No- Encumbrances” Obligation 
in the International Emission Trading Master 
Agreement 
This chapter presents an illustrative example of construing a contract for the sale of EU carbon 
credits. The contract is entered into by using the International Emission Trading Master 
Agreement (“IETMA”). In one transaction, the allowances were transferred to the buyer’s 
account from an account whose holder did not authorize the transfer. The holder of that account 
then claimed from the buyer its rights to the EU allowances. The buyer alleged that the seller had 
breached the no- encumbrances obligation and should pay damages. The seller disputed that 
allegation. To resolve the dispute, three aspects require contract interpretation: (1) whether the 
terms of the no- encumbrances obligation were incorporated in the disputed contract; (2) what 
was the meaning of the no-encumbrances obligation; and (3) what were the liabilities for breach 
of the no-encumbrances obligation.  
This chapter will introduce general rules and approaches in the contract construction exercise in 
respect of those three aspects. First, the chapter identifies that the regulations can cause risks in 
the transfer of carbon credits whereby a third party can claim an interest in the credits, and it 
discusses how such risks are allocated through terms that prescribe performance of the no-
encumbrances obligation. The chapter then summarizes general rules of contract construction 
under English law and reflects on two recent cases where relevant EU regulations were used in 
ascertaining the intentions of parties in the sale of EU carbon credits. Lastly, the chapter will 
provide an example where a dispute arose from an alleged breach of the no-encumbrances 
obligation in a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits entered into under the IETMA.  
In the light of English law, the research conducted for this thesis has discovered two ways in 
which the regulations of the EU carbon market can affect the contract interpretation exercise. 
First, the regulations of the EU carbon market can be treated as a context, or part of the “factual 
matrix”, against which contracts for the sales of EU carbon credits are formed and performed. 
Second, the disputed agreement can contain words and phrases that are identical to the language 
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of the relevant regulations.  The modern contract interpretation approach, it will be suggested, is 
adequate to address the complexities caused by the EU regulations being involved in the contract 
interpretation exercise. 
A No-Encumbrances Obligation 
Clause 5.3 in the body of the IETMA prescribes the meaning of the no-encumbrances obligation, 
and Clause 5.3.1 to Clause 5.3.4 in Schedule 4 to the IETMA prescribe the consequences of 
breaching it. 
1  Possible Defenses of the Seller to an Alleged Breach of the No-Encumbrances Obligation 
The seller may defend an alleged breach of the no-encumbrances on three grounds. It can dispute 
that it did not promise to deliver carbon credits free of liens, security interests, claims and 
encumbrances or any interest in or to them by any third party. The IETMA is a written master 
agreement205 that contracting parties usually use before they enter into a transaction. Signing the 
IETMA signifies that the contracting parties intend to build a contractual relationship in the sale 
and purchase of carbon credits, according to the terms of the IETMA. They can then enter into 
individual transactions, in writing or orally, to buy and sell carbon credits on the EU carbon 
market. The seller may defend that, in the current disputed transaction, it did not intend to be 
bound by the no-encumbrances obligation prescribed by the IETMA. However, normally, 
contracting parties do no renegotiate a master agreement for each individual transaction they make. 
The seller may claim that relevant EU regulations the parties directly expressed in negotiation 
prior to this disputed transaction can indicate they did not agree on the terms of the no-
encumbrances obligation. Alternatively, the seller may require the court to test whether the 
regulatory environment at the time of making the transaction in question would not lead reasonable 
businesspersons to agree on the terms of the no-encumbrances obligation in the IETMA. 
Another defense that the seller can make is that some lawful excuses caused its apparent breach of 
performance of the no-encumbrances obligation, so that it did not in fact commit a breach of 
contract. The lawful excuse might be occurrence of an illegality event, a force majeure event, or a 
frustrating event, due to incidents arising from certain EU regulations. 
The seller can also rely on Clause 5.3.4 of the Schedule 4 to the IETMA and claim relief from 
undertaking liabilities for the breach. The seller can defend that it acted in good faith when it first 
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acquired, received or purchased the carbon credits in question, while the buyer did not use its best 
endeavors to defend a claim of a third party in respect of the carbon credits, or the buyer did not 
act in good faith in purchasing the carbon credits or did not use all reasonable endeavors to 
mitigate the Encumbrance Loss Amount.206 
In an EU carbon credit transaction, when a dispute arises due to the alleged breach of the no- 
encumbrances obligation, contract interpretation may be needed to determine whether: 
1. the parties reached a contract on the transfer of carbon credits free of liens, security 
interests, claims and encumbrances or any interest in or to them by any third party; 
2. an illegality event, a frustrating event or a force majeure event occurred and relieved the 
buyer or the seller from meeting the no-encumbrances obligation; and/or 
3. the seller had acted in good faith, while the buyer did not use best endeavours, or did not 
act in good faith or use reasonable endeavours to defend the claim of the third party. 
2  Allocation of Regulatory Risks in the Transfer of Carbon Credits Free of Encumbrances 
Parties allocate risks in their contractual relationships. 207  Risk allocation is the concern of 
contracting parties in all kinds of markets.208 Risks in the performance of a no-encumbrances 
obligation are a type of risk common to transferring commodities. However, such risks can also be 
specific risks particular to the transfer of carbon credits, as they may arise from relevant EU 
regulations that are special to the EU carbon-credit transactions. The regulatory nature of such 
risks is reflected in the commission regulation.209 As allowances and Kyoto units exist only in a 
dematerialised form and are fungible, the title to an allowance or Kyoto unit should be established 
by their existence in the account of the Union Registry in which they are held. Moreover, to reduce 
the risks associated with the reversal of transactions entered in a registry, and the consequent 
disruption to the system and to the market that such a reversal may cause, it is necessary to ensure 
that allowances and Kyoto units are fully fungible. In particular, transactions cannot be reversed, 
revoked or unwound, other than as defined by the rules of the registry, after a time prescribed by 
those rules. According to regulations of the EU registry system, an account holder or a third party 
can claim rights that they may have in law in respect of a finalized transaction due to fraud or 
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technical error. But, the transaction cannot be reversed, revoked or unwound.210  Furthermore, t he  
acquisition of an allowance or Kyoto unit in good faith should be protected. 211 This article is 
further elaborated in Article 40, “Nature of allowances and finality of transactions”: 
1. An allowance or Kyoto unit shall be a fungible, dematerialised instrument that is 
tradable on the market. 
2. The dematerialized nature of allowances and Kyoto units shall imply that the record of 
the Union Registry shall constitute prima facie and sufficient evidence of title over an 
allowance or Kyoto unit, and of any other matter that is by this Regulation directed or 
authorised to be recorded in the Union Registry. 
3. The fungibility of allowances and Kyoto units shall imply that any recovery or 
restitution obligations that may arise under national law in respect of an allowance or 
Kyoto unit shall only apply to the allowance or Kyoto unit in kind. 
4. A purchaser and holder of an allowance or Kyoto unit acting in good faith shall acquire 
title to an allowance or Kyoto unit free of any defects in the title of the transferor. 
For example, person A holding a certain amount of carbon credits in its account under the Union 
Registry would enjoy “prima facie and sufficient evidence of title” over the carbon credits. In fact, 
A stole the carbon credits from B’s account. C purchased these carbon credits from A and C took 
A’s holding of the credits as a proof of A’s title over the carbon credits. C then sold those carbon 
credits to D. After C transferred carbon credits to D, B claimed its interests in the carbon credits 
from D alleges that C breached the no-encumbrances obligation. Alternatively, A did not steal the 
carbon credits from B, but rather used the carbon credits as security to support a loan from B. A 
then sold those credits to C and C took A’s holding of the credits as a proof of A’s title over the 
carbon credits. C then sold those carbon credits to D. After C transferred the carbon credits to D, B 
claimed its interests in the carbon credits from D. D alleges that C has breached the no-
encumbrances obligation. 
Risks exist in the sale of EU carbon credits free of third parties’ interests. The same kind of risks 
exist in the sale of other kinds of commodities. However, risks in the performance of the no-
encumbrances obligation can be caused specially by regulations in the case of contracts for the sale 
of EU carbon credits. For example, B claims its interests in the carbon credits from D. D would get 
damages if C were held liable for breach of the no-encumbrances obligation. According to the 
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regulations, if C acted in good faith when receiving the carbon credits from A, C would acquire 
title to the carbon credits. By transferring carbon credits to which C has title, C cannot be said to 
be in breach of the no-encumbrances obligation, because C did not breach its promise — 
delivering carbon credits to which it has title. 
To avoid one party assuming too much of the risk in performing the no-encumbrances obligation, 
the EU ETS System Schedule in the IETMA allocates such risks as follows: 
(1) The Delivering Party shall be liable if not acting in good faith when it purchased the 
affected carbon credits; 
(2) The Delivering Party who acted in good faith in its purchase of the affected carbon 
credits will still be liable if: 
a. regardless of the Receiving Party is the holder of such Affected Allowance and is 
subject to a claim of the Original Affected Party, has, in order to resist or avoid 
any Encumbrance Loss Amount from arising, used its best endeavours to defend 
such a claim in respect of that Affected Allowance (including, if available, by 
relying on Article 37 of the Registries Regulation or any equivalent legal principle 
under its applicable national law) and was unsuccessful (other than for reasons of 
its own lack of good faith); or 
b. the Receiving Party, whether or not is the holder of such Affected Allowance, who 
acted in good faith in respect of its purchase of such Affected Allowance and who 
is subject to a claim of a third party (other than the Original Affected Party) in 
respect of that Affected Allowance, has used all reasonable endeavors to mitigate 
the Encumbrance Loss Amount.212 
By the terms of the IETMA, B is the Original Affected Party, D is the Receiving Party, C is the 
Delivering Party and the carbon credits in question are the Affected Allowance. When B claims its 
interests in the carbon credits from C, whether C can successfully claim that D is in breach of the 
no- encumbrances obligation and shall undertake liabilities for the breach depends on how the 
courts construe: 
(1) Whether C and D entered into a transaction where D promised it would deliver 
carbon credits free of encumbrances; 
(2) Whether the carbon credits in question are Affected Allowances; 
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(3) Whether C acted in good faith when it purchased carbon credits from A; 
(4) Whether D acted in good faith when it purchased carbon credits from C; and 
(5) Whether D used “best endeavors” or “reasonable endeavors” defending B’s claim or 
mitigating its loss. 
In summary, the key issues are the disputed terms were incorporated into the parties’ cohort and, if 
so, what is the correct interpretation of the language used to express the parties’ interests.  
B Rules of Contract Interpretation under the English Law 
Generally, the court seeks to ascertain the intentions of contracting parties through the 
interpretation of the express contractual terms. The basic approach of the court is to take an 
objective approach whereby the court ascertains the meaning of the document from the 
perspective of a reasonable person. 213The reasonable person is considered as someone who 
possesses “all the knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the 
situation in which they were at the time of the contract”,214 or to “the person or class of persons to 
whom the document is addressed”.215The reasonably available knowledge, which is customarily 
referred to as the “background” or  the “matrix of facts”,216includes anything217 that would have 
affected the way a reasonable person would have understood the language of the document.218 A 
reasonable person would also have used knowledge of the relevant law in understanding a 
commercial document. 219 The relevant law is referred to as the law that forms part of the 
background to the agreement. 
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The reasonably available knowledge as the “background” or the “matrix of fact” provides 
extrinsic evidence that may be admissible in contract interpretation. The use of background 
knowledge as extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation can be restricted to cases where the 
words of the contractual document are ambiguous,220 or senseless,221 or in conflict with other 
words in the same document,222 or technical terms. The use of background as extrinsic evidence is 
not so restrictive in cases where the background is considered part of the “unitary exercise” of 
contract interpretation.223 
While the background to a contractual document can provide extrinsic evidence in the process of 
contract construction, some extrinsic evidence may not be admitted. For example, previous 
negotiations of the parties that show the nature and object of the contractual venture are 
admissible, but most that show what the parties discussed in the course of negotiation are not.224 
Previous negotiations of the parties may be admitted to show that the parties placed an 
unconventional meaning to a word or a phrase or to give meaning to a word or a phrase that has an 
unconventional meaning.225 A prior contract may or may not be admissible evidence,226 depending 
on whether it was superseded by a later contract.227 The conduct of the parties after contract 
formation that shows an intention to vary the original agreement,228 or to raise an estoppel229 may 
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be admissible evidence, but the same evidence, cannot be used to interpret the meaning of the 
original agreement.230 
 
1  Interpretation of the Parties’ Intention to Incorporate Terms of the No-Encumbrances 
Obligation into the Contract 
Contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits that employ the IETMA, are made subject to the 
standard terms of the IETMA as settled by a trade association — the IETA. The standard terms of 
the IETMA are typically incorporated by reference. 231  In event of inconsistency between the 
individually negotiated terms in the parties’ contract and the standard terms, the former terms 
prevails,232 unless some provision in the standard terms is overriding.233  This is provided in Clause 
2.2 (e) and (f) of the IETMA. 
Parties to a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits typically house their contracts in several 
documents pursuant to the “master contract” — the IETMA and the EU ETS Trading Schedule is 
also executed each time a new individual transaction is made. Formation of a contract for the sale 
of EU carbon credits can be proved by ascertaining a clear intention on the part of the parties that 
the terms contained in the main body of the IETMA, the EU ETS Trading Schedule, and a 
confirmation have been incorporated into their agreement.234 
In construing whether terms are incorporated into a contract, extrinsic evidence may not be given 
to contradict or vary the effect of the formal contract.235 Such evidence might be admissible in 
cases where statutory provisions can render the agreement void,236 which may be applicable in 
construing whether terms of the no-encumbrances obligation are incorporated into the contract. 
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Due to the effect of regulations on the incorporation of terms, the regulations can be involved in 
contract interpretation. 
(a) Interpretation of the Terms of No-Encumbrances Obligation 
 
Lord Hoffmann re-stated the principles applying to contract interpretation in Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society. 237  Those principles emphasize 
interpreting words in ordinary life and discarding almost all the old intellectual baggage of “legal” 
interpretation. 238  If certain words are prescribed by statutory provisions or have a particular 
meaning, their particular meaning overrides the common law and is not to be ascertained in the 
light of “ordinary life”.239 So, in interpreting the terms of the no-encumbrances obligation, the 
meaning of words that are prescribed by the relevant regulations of the EU carbon market cannot 
be ascertained in the light of the applicable principles re-stated by Lord Hoffmann. If the words 
uttered by the parties are general words, they are to be interpreted objectively against a background 
of which a reasonable person would understand. 
Two cases of contract interpretation in relation contracts for the sale of carbon credits will now be 
examined as a preliminary discussion of applicable rules in interpreting terms of the no-
encumbrances obligation in a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits. Due to the effect of 
regulations on the meaning of terms in such contexts, the regulations are necessarily implicated in 
the contract interpretation exercise in the present context. 
C Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global Steel Ltd240 and Armstrong DLW GMBH v 
Winnington Networks Ltd241 
Although these two cases addressed different legal issues, and had individually specific case 
backgrounds, both of them reflect the fact that the regulations can be relevant in the contract 
interpretation exercise in two ways. First, they are used to define the meaning of words and 
phrases of the disputed terms in the litigated case; second, they are used as part of the “context” in 
which contracts were made and performed. In both cases, words and phrases of the disputed terms, 
and the common intentions of the contracting parties, were construed against the backdrop of 
regulations of the EU carbon market. Particular rules of the regulations might be used directly to 
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define the contractual language, or the objectives and whole commercial context that are created by 
the regulations might be used to test commercial common sense. These two cases provide an 
insight into how the modern judicial approach can be applied in the construction of a disputed 
contractual performance in the carbon-credit sale context. 
1  Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global Steel Ltd (“Deutsche Bank”)242 
The EU Commission imposed a check in December 2009 and January 2010, to prevent re-use of 
Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”) that had been used to comply with emission limitation 
obligations under the EU Emission Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”). This issue led to legal disputes 
between Deutsche Bank AG (“DB”) and Total Global Steel Ltd (“TGS”). DB claimed that TGS 
breached its contracts with DB by delivering CERs that were prevented by the check. The judicial 
construction of contracts between DB and TGS mainly focused on defining the exact subject 
matter that the contracting parties intended to trade, and the meaning of the disputed term that 
provided the delivery obligation of TGS. By reference to the regulations of the EU carbon market, 
the Court found that TGS breached the contracts by delivering surrendered CERs. 
It was interpreted that a check that occurred in the regulatory context of the EU ETS rendered 
impossible the trading of surrendered CERs.243 Based on judicial interpretation of the legal position 
of the Directive and the Regulation, it was also unlawful to trade surrendered CERs.244 An event in 
the regulatory context can render contractual performance of trading CERs impossible, while the 
contractual performance becomes unlawful if it was interpreted as against the regulations. The 
approach in this case would not vary if the contracted carbon credits were EUAs. As earlier 
explained, EUAs and CERs are carbon credits that the regulations of the EU ETS treat as 
equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide to comply with emission limitation obligations. Usually, 
market participants use the same contractual framework to trade all carbon credits and do allow 
one type of credits to be replaced by another type. It can be said that the judicial approach in 
Deutsche Bank to the relevance of the EU regulations in the contract provides three references to 
the courts in construing carbon-credit sale contracts in future cases. 
The first reference is relevant to contractual construction as to incorporation of a term that defined 
the instruments that DB and TGS intended to trade. The second and third references relate to 
contractual construction as to the meaning of that incorporated term. 
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(a) Using the EU ETS Regulations to Determine the Incorporation of a Term 
When DB submitted that the EU ETS regulations should be taken into account as background 
knowledge to DB and TGS at the time of entering into the four controversial sales, the Court 
accepted and treated the EU ETS as “factual matrix” evidence.245 The Court considered the EU 
ETS as reasonably available information to the trading parties of CERs, and ascertained that DB 
and TGS would intend to trade conventional CERs, not surrendered CERs. 246  CERs were 
defined as a sub-type of EU Credits by a term in the Emission Annex, which was part of the 
standard contractual terms that DB and TGS had always been using for trading. The Court 
indicated that it would have, on the basis of the Annex’s definition of an EU Credit alone, 
concluded that the four sales between DB and TGS intended to deal in conventional CERs.247 The 
Court took the treatment of the EU ETS as “factual matrix” as reinforcement to its conclusion. The 
implication was that such a conclusion could be reached without considering the EU ETS as 
“factual matrix”. 
Arguably, based solely on the Annex’s term that defines an EU Credit, it would be difficult to 
determine whether DB and TGS agreed to trade CERs or surrendered CERs. First, the Annex’s 
term defined an EU Credit as “A Certified Emissions Reduction or an Emissions Reduction Unit as 
defined in the Directive that may be used for determining compliance with emissions limitation 
commitments pursuant to and in accordance with the Scheme.” It categorized “CERs” as a type of 
EU Credits. But it did not specify what CERs really were. It might have been argued that a CER 
may include surrendered CERs, a large-hydro CER, a cancelled CER, an unissued CERs, etc. and 
that all of them might have been able to meet the requirements, depending on the EU ETS at the 
time. To ascertain whether DB and TGS incorporated this Annex’s term to refer to CERs, the EU 
ETS had to be taken into account as “factual matrix”. The Commission’s announcement relating to 
surrendered CERs made them as unique as “large-hydro CERs”, in contrast to other 
“conventional” CERs. The information of “surrendered CERs” was inferred as reasonably 
available to DB and TGS as the information of “large-hydro CERs”.248 DB and TGS had discussed 
whether the contracted CERs could have been “large-hydro CERs” or “non-large hydro”, so as to 
decide whether they could incorporate the Annex’s term to define the CERs they agreed to trade. 
From an objective standpoint, it seemed unreasonable that they omitted discussion of surrendered 
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CERs which were as distinctive as large-hydro CERs in terms of being specially regulated by 
authorities of the EU ETS. 
Second, the Annex’s term that defined an EU Credit was part of the standard contract. It did not 
tell the circumstances in which it was made, nor did it tell the circumstances that changed after it 
was made. In addition, it was not tailored for the specific four sales of surrendered CERs. As part 
of the standard contract terms, the Annex’s definition of an EU Credit was provided with 
formality. It was provided a long time before DB and TGS entered into the sales of CERs over the 
telephone. Sales over the telephone would be informal formations of agreements. The Court 
considered the EU ETS as an informative background against which it could objectively be 
construed whether the contracting parties could have had due regard to the information of 
surrendered CERs during telephone conversations, and whether such information could have been 
foreseen in the formation of standard contractual terms. 
In this case, the Court treated the EU ETS as “factual matrix” to construe that the Annex’s term 
was incorporated in the four controversial sales. The EU ETS regulations acted as an 
indispensable surrounding circumstance in determining the scope of extrinsic evidence, such as 
parties’ conduct and texts of documents, so as to consider which evidence was admissible as to the 
natural interpretation of the contracts. 
The Court disregarded certain conduct, texts and prior negotiations that had objectively appeared. 
In the light of the EU ETS, the extrinsic evidence appeared unable to supply a natural 
interpretation of the intentions of DB and TGS; it was hence excluded. For example, on 8 March, 
before DB and TGS entered into their first sale of CERs, they had briefly discussed surrendered 
CERs. This extrinsic evidence was excluded by the Court as contrary to natural interpretation.249 
The Court considered that the “nature of the business” of DB and TGS would involve a brief 
discussion of any piece of information that circulated among various trading desks on stock 
exchanges.250 A brief discussion of surrendered CERs, which was never recollected, was unable to 
show that DB and TGS intended to trade surrendered CERs.251 
On the other hand, the Court discovered three other extrinsic facts, based on which it interpreted 
that a brief discussion of surrendered CERs between DB and TGS on 8 March could not evident 
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that they intended to sell surrendered CERs.252 The three facts were drawn from conduct of the 
contracting parties and a market event. First, the concern of DB was whether CERs were “large 
hydro” or “non-large hydro”. The Court believed that DB did not suppose that CERs would have 
been the “non-large hydro” type every time. It inferred that, if DB had ever contemplated 
surrendered CERs in one sale of CERs, DB would have asked about them in the previous or the 
following sale.253 Second, in one of the four sales, TGS said it was watching the price of CERs on 
BlueNext. DB said it was “looking at the screen” for the market price, but it did not specify the 
screen of which stock exchange. At the time, the price shown on the screen of BlueNext was for 
conventional, non-large hydro CERs.254 And the price was more or less the same as DB paid to 
TGS.255 The Court considered it natural to infer that DB was watching the screen of BlueNext too. 
The implication was that if DB had surrendered CERs in mind, it would not have paid for them at 
the price of the conventional, non-hydro CERs.256 Third, on 12 March, before the fourth sale, DB 
raised a concern as to the spot market, which had been “rocked” by the trading of surrendered 
CERs. The implication was that DB would not agree to buy instruments whose market price had 
fluctuated. 
The exclusion of that brief discussion of surrendered CERs on 8 March, and the inclusion of other 
three items of evidence as part of the exercise of natural interpretation, necessarily required the 
context of the EU ETS to be objectively viewed. Since the Commission’s announcement relating 
to surrendered CERs, information of surrendered CERs was as reasonably available to market 
participants as information of large-hydro. The parties had mentioned “large-hydro” or “non-large 
hydro” before each sale. The same reasonably available information of surrendered CERs should 
have drawn the parties’ attention to surrendered CERs. If they intended to trade the surrendered 
CERs, they would have discussed surrendered CERs as much as large-hydro CERs. 
The natural interpretation of these extrinsic facts, which confirmed that the intention of DB was to 
buy conventional CERs, was reached by taking the EU ETS regulations into account. The 
objective view of a reasonable person is to be construed with what constituted “reasonableness” in 
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the relevant context. To be sure, a reasonable person in the EU ETS would not have the same 
“reasonableness” as a reasonable person in the NZ ETS. So, my first point of view is that the EU 
ETS is the factual matrix that must be used to test the “reasonableness” of a reasonable person. To 
test the “reasonableness” of a reasonable person regarding his or her intention in trading CERs, the 
Court used the EU ETS as factual matrix to obtain an objective interpretation of all the other 
extrinsic evidence in the course of dealing between the contracting parties. 
(b) Using the EU ETS to Ascertain the Meaning of Contract Terms 
DB and TGS then argued on the meaning of the term that defined CERs. It was provided that 
CERs “may be used for determining compliance purposes pursuant to and in accordance with” the 
EU ETS.257 Their argument essentially was one as to determining the liability of TGS in delivering 
surrendered CERs to DB. If surrendered CERs had been able to meet the prescription of this term, 
TGS would not have been considered to have breached its obligation as a seller. To determine the 
liability of TGS, the Court chose “may be used” as the key phrase for interpretation.  It first 
reasoned as to how a reasonable business person would understand the meaning of “may be used”, 
and then interpreted in reality the state of affairs in the use of surrendered CERs. The Court took a 
contextual approach to interpret the phrase “may be used” from the perspective of business 
common sense.  
What made sense to businessmen under the EU ETS would differ from under other ETSs. The 
reasonable expectation of businessmen who trade CERs comes from their knowledge about the 
legal permission and restrains, as well as the realization of their commercial purposes, at the time 
of entering into contracts. And such legal, regulatory and other circumstances would differ from 
one legal regime to another. Additionally, in one regime, the circumstances would be changing 
over time. The term of what would be CERs in the sales between DB and TGS was provided much 
earlier than the Commission announcement, which gave rise to a changed circumstance of the EU 
ETS. So, the difference lies between a contextual approach to the interpretation of “may be used” 
and the interpretation of “may be used” in the changed context. 
“May be used” was held as meaning that DB and TGS intended to trade instruments that were 
allowed by the EU ETS to be used for exchange.258 “To be used for exchange” concerns DB and 
TGS, and the commercial purpose of the exchange gave rise to their reasonable expectations. 
Legal and regulatory permissions and constrains of the EU ETS precondition whether the 
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instruments can be used for exchange and affect the commercial outcome of trading. When the EU 
ETS changed with regard to surrendered CERs, the words “may be used” can be best functioned 
by the meaning “may be allowed for exchange” under the EU ETS. In terms of business common 
sense, practical matters that realistically affect the use of CERs cover legal matters that give legal 
effect to the use of CERs. When the Commission’s announcement prevented exchange of 
surrendered CERs, the requirement for CERs intended by the term should be construed to mean 
CERs that are legally entitled “pursuant to and in accordance with” the EU ETS and not CERs that 
are prohibited in any exchange.259 
The state of affairs in the use of CERs, apart from impracticability to use surrendered CERs, which 
was incompatible with business common sense, also includes unlawfulness to do so. The 
Commission’s announcement prevented the use of surrendered CERs in reality, and, as part of the 
legislative provisions of the EU ETS, it destroyed the lawfulness of using surrendered CERs. 
While business common sense was the ground on which the Court construed the meaning of CERs 
that “may be used for determining compliance purposes pursuant to and in accordance with” the 
EU ETS, the supervening unlawfulness did not become a ground on which the Court applied the 
doctrine of illegality in respect of the four sales of surrendered CERs. TGS was liable for 
delivering surrendered CERs, in so far as it breached the term that required it to deliver CERs that 
had a commercially viable purpose, rather than liable for delivering surrendered CERs that were 
unlawful. 
2  Armstrong DLW GMBH v Winnington Networks Ltd (“Armstrong”)260 
Armstrong dealt with an issue regarding whether Winnington, who had purchased carbon credits 
from Zen, but which credits had been received from Armstrong’s trading account, should pay for 
Armstrong’s loss. The key was to identify the legal title that holders of emission trading accounts 
can have on the carbon credits in their accounts, and the interests of a third party who claims 
ownership over the carbon credits in the emission trading accounts of another. However, no 
previous case or legal rules or regulations defined legal title and third-party rights in carbon credits 
at that time. Armstrong provided a precedent about the legal grounds on which a third party can 
claim an interest in carbon credits in a sale contract between other parties. This section will discuss 
the judicial approach to the resolution of the legal dispute over title and interests of carbon credits 
in this case. It will be suggested that a purposive approach was taken to construe the disputed legal 
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title and interests of the carbon credits in the context of regulations of the EU carbon market. This 
purposive approach can maximize commercial interests that can be realized through emission 
trading, as well as providing certainty to the operation of the emission-trading market. It will be 
discussed next as to how its application in contractual construction can be reflected in the 
Armstrong, and how such an approach might be beneficial to contract construction to determine 
liabilities for breach of the no-encumbrances obligation in carbon-credit sale contracts in the 
context of amended regulations. 
(a) Identification of Legal Nature of an Allowance in Armstrong 
The judgment in Armstrong was the first to identify the legal nature of an emission allowance as 
intangible property.261 It stated that legal interests and equitable interests in an allowance can be 
separated at the point when the fraud phished it.262 After the Armstrong case, the Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 2216/2004 was amended to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1193/2011 and 
then the Commission Regulation No 389/2013. Recital 12 and Article 37 in the Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1193/2011, recital 8 and Article 40 in the Commission Regulation No 
389/2013, clarified the nature, legal title and third-party rights in an allowance or Kyoto unit, 
coinciding with the judgment. It is specified, in the amended Commission Regulation that 
dematerialization and fungibility are two characteristics of an allowance or Kyoto unit. An 
allowance or Kyoto unit can only exist in the nature of dematerialized things. The recording of 
such an allowance or unit in a registry account is in itself an evidence of its title.  This means when 
an allowance or Kyoto unit has transferred from one registry account to another, its title would be 
transferred with it to another registry account. After transfer of an allowance or Kyoto unit, anyone 
who, by a national law, has a right or claim to recovery or restitution from a transaction in respect 
of an allowance or Kyoto unit, can exercise that right or claim, without reversal, revocation or 
unwinding of the transaction that has finalized in the registry. This is because the fungible nature 
of an allowance or Kyoto unit allows the recovery or restitution obligations to be paid in kind.263 
However, the finalized transaction264 cannot be reversed, revoked or unwound. Since title is 
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attached to the recoding of an allowance or Kyoto unit in a registry account, “irrevocable 
transaction” means that the legal title to the allowance or Kyoto unit can be separated from the 
right that it is to be recovered or disgorged in respect of the allowance or Kyoto unit. Irrevocability 
of the transaction and the dematerialized nature of an allowance or Kyoto unit secure its legal title 
to the holder of a registry account in which it is held. In the event that a third-party claims rights in 
respect of the contracted allowance or Kyoto unit, legal title can still be transferred with the 
transfer of the allowances or Kyoto units. Meanwhile, the fungibility of an allowance or Kyoto 
unit allows the third party to claim its value without its legal title, which optimizes its commercial 
value. 
By reference to the judgment in Armstrong, it can be inferred that, at the point when B was 
considered taking control of the emission allowances in C’s account, legal interests and equitable 
interests in the emission allowances became separated. According to the amended Commission 
Regulation No 389/2013, two consequences could arise. According to Article 40(2) in the 
Commission Regulation No 389/2013, legal title in emission allowances is attached to the registry 
account where the emission allowances are held. So, when the emission allowances left C’s 
registry account, C lost legal title over them. When A received the emission allowances in its 
registry account, A gained legal title over them. But, Article 40(4) in the amended Regulation No 
389/2013 provides that “[a] purchaser and holder of an allowance or Kyoto unit acting in good 
faith shall acquire title to an allowance or Kyoto unit free of any defects in the title of the 
transferor.” In other words, if the emission allowances that A purchased from B were defective, 
for example because they were stolen by B from C, and if A conducted itself in a way that contrast 
to good faith, A cannot acquire title to the emission allowances. If the conduct of A can be 
established as being in good faith, then A can acquire title to the emission allowances. 
However, regardless of whether A can acquire legal title, C cannot recover the same emission 
allowances back to its registry account, thus legal title. Article 40(3) also provides that a finalized 
transfer cannot be reversed, revoked, or unwound. Yet, Article 40(3) provides that “allowances and 
Kyoto units” are fully fungible, and that the fungibility of allowances and Kyoto units shall imply 
that any recovery or restitution obligations that may arise under national law in respect of an 
allowance or Kyoto unit shall only apply to the allowance or Kyoto unit in kind. So, C can recover 
the value of the emission allowances in the form of any other kind of carbon credit or in the form 
of money. The possibility that legal title and equitable interest in an emission allowance can be 
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separated justifies that “recovery or restitution obligations” shall be performed with the allowance 
“in kind”, and the finalized transfer will not be reversed, revoked or unwound. C can be paid with 
other types of allowance or the monetary value of the allowances, but C cannot claim return of the 
same emission allowances that were taken from C. 
(b) Modification of “State of Knowledge” with Commercially Unaccepted Conduct 
Another issue that must also be addressed regards the necessary condition for C’s recovery or 
restitution in respect of the emission allowances. The Article 40(4) stipulates “good faith” as a 
necessary condition for a purchaser or a holder of an allowance to acquire its title.  If a purchaser 
or a holder lacks good faith, it will not acquire title to an allowance. However, accounts in the 
Union Registry are governed by the laws that fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State of 
their administrator and the units held in them are considered to be situated in that Member State’s 
territory. The interpretation of “good faith” will be left to the national court. It is left to the national 
court to decide the elements that constitute A’s “bad faith”, and the conditions by which C can 
succeed in its claim of A lacking good faith. This interpretation may vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. The Armstrong case, which was governed by English law, can at least provide some 
insight for common-law jurisdictions. Standard documents of emission trading agreements and 
most of their individually modified versions choose English law as the governing law. 
As Armstrong shows, a third party can make three claims in a contract for the sale of carbon-
credits: a common-law claim to vindicate property rights in the emission allowances, a common-
law claim based on unjust enrichment, and/or a claim in equity based on unconscionable receipt of 
the emission allowances or their traceable proceeds. To these three claims, the corresponding 
defenses would be bona fide purchaser for value without notice, good-faith change of position, or 
that the defendant had no knowledge of the defect of the emission allowances it received. Although 
notice, good faith and ignorance have distinct elements, they were “aligned” by the Court on a 
common ground to address all the three types of claim. This common ground was “commercially 
unacceptable conduct”, by which the Court tested good faith, notice and knowing receipt.265 
“Commercially unacceptable conduct” as a test for absence of good faith was laid down in Niru 
Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd,266 which was cited by the Court in Armstrong. 
Absence of good faith can be proved by “a failure to act in a commercially acceptable way”.267 
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This can be in the form of dishonesty, but it does not necessarily have to be dishonesty itself. The 
commercially unacceptable act is gauged by the extent of knowledge of the enriched recipient that 
is considered sufficient in a commercial context. To determine whether the knowledge suffices to 
cause doubt to a reasonable business person, the commercial context of the case at hand should be 
considered. The enriched recipient need not to actually know that what it received was defective. 
The recipient need only possess certain knowledge of the circumstances that would be considered 
sufficient in a commercial context. Sufficient knowledge of the circumstances gives rise to a duty 
of the enriched recipient as an honest and reasonable person to make inquiries. If it did not make 
inquiries, it may be considered acting in a commercially unacceptable way, thus contrary to good 
faith. Commercially unacceptable conduct was also used by the Court to assess “notice” in 
connection with the defense of bona fide purchaser or “knowledge” in “knowing receipt of trust 
property”.268In a commercial context, not making inquiries, based on notice or knowledge of 
certain facts, can constitute commercially unacceptable conduct. The defense of bona fide 
purchase can be defeated, and the unconscionability of the defendant can be established. 
The Armstrong case laid down test of commercially unacceptable conduct in the context of 
emission trading. The Court found that Winnington’s conduct in relation to its “Know Your 
Customer” procedure was commercially unacceptable. In the context of emission trading, when 
Winnington was considering entering into a contractual relationship with Zen, the knowledge of 
certain facts that Winnington possessed was sufficient to put a reasonable business person on 
notice, hence obligating him or her to make further inquiries about those facts, especially 
regarding matters of “Know Your Customer” check that were emailed to Zen. The knowledge that 
Zen was a stranger that had not revealed its registry account would have generated doubt in the 
mind of reasonable traders in the EU ETS. However, it was argued that in a usual commercial 
dealing, enquiry as to the counterparty’s identity was necessary for a finding of commercially 
acceptable conduct.269 In the Armstrong case, the conduction of “Know Your Customer”, which 
functions to enquire as to the real identity of the counterparties, was considered to be 
commercially acceptable conduct on the part of the purchaser under the EU ETS to ensure whether 
its counterparty has authority to transfer the relevant emission allowances. This is because in the 
context of the EU ETS, no EU ETS rules or emission trading practice can indicate that transfer of 
emission allowances is proof of ownership or authority. It was interpreted that Winnington’s 
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passing on allowances when it had no certainty as to Zen’s identity amounted to commercially 
unacceptable conduct. 
Commercially unacceptable conduct recognized by Armstrong was that, before authorization of a 
transaction, the allowances recipient must verify its counterparty’s identity and account 
information. In the future, where a third party claims an interest in a transaction in respect of the 
contracted-for carbon credits, the recipient of the affected emission allowances can establish that 
its conduct was in good faith, so that it was a bona fide purchaser and it was not liable for knowing 
receipt, because it conducted itself in a commercially acceptable way by ensuring its 
counterparty’s identity and account information before authorization of the emission allowance, it 
then bears no obligation of recovery or restitution to the third party. 
D A Purposive Approach to Interpreting Terms Concerning Regulations of the EU Carbon 
Market 
Both Armstrong and Deutsche Bank show that the relevant EU regulations may be a reference 
point for providing particular meanings of certain words prescribed by the regulations, or they may 
constitute “background” for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of general words. The 
relevance of EU regulations in contract performance on the EU Carbon market makes 
interpretation of such contracts different from other kinds of contracts in several aspects. It can be 
suggested that the two cases adopted a purposive approach to interpreting terms that concern the 
regulations of the EU carbon market. 
For example, in Deutsche Bank, where the Court interpreted whether and what the contracting 
parties exactly agreed to as the “CERs” to be transferred, the relevant EU regulations were used as 
a reference point for giving a particular meaning, as well as a background to test the knowledge of 
the contracting parties that would allow them to reasonably understand the meaning of the words 
they used to describe what they intended to transfer. The same is true for the Armstrong case. 
However, the influence of the EU regulations in the Armstrong case was slightly different than in 
Deutsche Bank. In Armstrong the EU regulations were used more as a background to test what 
constituted “good faith” in the sale and purchase of carbon credits. 
The courts in the two illustrative cases used public policy as a source of regulatory risks, or a 
source of background knowledge, rather than circumscribing the terms agreed. The two cases 
demonstrate the protection of commercial interests in the face of regulator risks. In Deutsche Bank, 
the contract interpretation deals with the contractual allocation of risks associated with 
impossibility and unlawfulness to use the contracted carbon credits. The EU regulations that grant 
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legal entitlements to the carbon credits do not invalidate the contract. By a purposive approach, 
such regulations of legal entitlements of the carbon credits in question were taken as a source of 
risks or source of background knowledge to the contracting parties, to produce a construction 
consistent with business common sense. In Armstrong, a purposive approach was taken to testing 
“good faith” of the transferee of carbon credits with defective legal titles. This case laid the ground 
that subsequently found resonation later on in the regulations of the EU ETS and the IETMA: (1) 
the right of purchasers or account holders of the carbon credits; (2) dematerialization and 
fungibility of the carbon credits; and (3) allocation of risks that are caused by how the EU 
regulations design and regulate the carbon credits and transactions in respect of them. 
The purchaser or account holders of carbon credits, who acted in good faith, could retain legal title 
of the emission allowances that may be legal property of a third party. This makes it possible that 
third parties can be compensated with values equivalent to that of the carbon credits over which 
they claim rights. In this way, the finalized transactions do not have to be reversed, revoked or 
unwound. Enhanced protection and enforceability of legal title and equitable interests in emission 
allowances has led to optimization of the commercial value of carbon credits, which is significant 
to the sale of carbon credits through financial contracts. Although third-party rights and security 
interests are not identical concepts, an asset in which a third party can be granted with a right 
would also be capable of supporting the creation of a security interest on it.270 Financialization 
contributes to the prosperity of the market. Financial motivation and market confidence increase 
the functionality of the emissions market.271 
However, Armstrong and the amended Commission Regulation have not exactly clarified the 
liabilities of contracting parties in the transfer of defective carbon credits. Generally, contracts for 
the sale of carbon credits allocate risks in the transfer of carbon credits with defective legal title in 
terms of the no-encumbrances obligation. For example, the “no-encumbrance” clause in the IETA 
standard Master Agreement holds the delivering party responsible to ensure that the delivered 
emission allowances are free from third-party rights. Contracting parties may negotiate in a 
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manner similar to that of    Clauses 5.3.1. to 5.3.4. of Schedule 4 in the IETMA. “Good faith” is still 
left to the interpretation of the applicable national laws. In the construction of a contract for the 
sale of EU carbon credits that use the IETMA, tests for “good faith”, “best endeavours” and 
“reasonable endeavours” are crucial. 
Under the revised Commission Regulation, whether Winnington was in good faith has a direct 
influence on whether it has title to the transferred allowances. But under the IETMA, whether Zen 
was acting in good faith determines the liabilities of Winnington and Zen in the transfer of 
defective carbon credits. If Zen acted in good faith, Winnington must use best endeavours to 
defend against the claim of the original victim of the theft or by other affected persons. Only when 
the buyer used its best endeavours and cannot succeed in defending against the claim will the seller 
incur liability. If Winnington sold the allowances, it would have a responsibility to use reasonable 
endeavours to mitigate its losses. If Zen did not act in good faith, it will be liable to Winnington 
for its breach of the no-encumbrances obligation. The liabilities of contracting parties in breach of 
contract due to the transfer of defective carbon credits actually changes from solely the seller’s 
responsibility to a sharing of liabilities as between the seller and the buyer. 
In Armstrong, the Court, by construing the “good faith” of Winnington, may establish a precedent 
for testing the “good faith” of buyers and sellers in future cases where the title of the contracted-
for carbon credits is defective. But the judgment could have been varied due to a different 
applicable law. Winnington was a British company. Its account would be managed by the 
administrator of the United Kingdom. And its account would be governed by the laws and fall 
under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, and the carbon credits it held in its accounts would 
be considered to be situated in the United Kingdom.272 If the allowances that Armstrong claimed 
were situated in accounts that were managed by the administrator of the Netherlands, Dutch law 
may be the applicable law. According to Dutch law, the construction of the “good faith” of 
Winnington in transferring the allowances would be different. And its liabilities for being in breach 
of contract with Zen would be different. 
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The test for “good faith”, “best endeavours” and “reasonable endeavours” is crucial in determining 
the liabilities of transferors and transferees in the transfer of carbon credits with defective legal 
title. 
E Conclusion 
The risks of transferring EU carbon credits with defective legal title can be caused by the relevant 
EU regulations regarding the legal title, the transactional process, and the consequences of 
transferring carbon credits with defective legal title. In the light of rules of contract interpretation 
under English law and two case examples, this chapter has suggested that a purposive approach is 
likely to be taken in better construing terms of contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits that 
concern the EU regulations. The regulations may be involved in construing whether the disputed 
terms would be validly incorporated in the contract, since a contract can be subject to the rules of 
the relevant emission trading schemes. The regulations may also be involved in the ascertainment 
of the meaning of disputed terms, since certain aspects of contractual terms must be in accordance 
with the relevant regulations. By a purposive approach to contract interpretation, the relevant EU 
regulations are more likely to be taken as background knowledge that might be regarded as 






The central inquiry of this thesis has concerned the question of whether, in the event of an alleged 
breach of a contract for the sale of EU carbon credits, the regulations of the EU carbon market are 
relevant to identifying and construing the allegedly breached contractual terms, and, if so, how the 
law relating to the contract construction exercise may address such relevance. To address this 
central inquiry, three sub-inquiries were undertaken. 
The first sub-inquiry addressed the governing effects that the relevant EU regulations have on 
carbon-credit transactions occurring within the EU carbon market. Three governing effects were 
found and presented in Chapter Two. First, the relevant regulations create the rights and values to 
use carbon credits. Second, the relevant regulations manage the issuance, allocation, transfer and 
cancellation of carbon credits in the registry system. Third, the relevant regulations control the 
behavior of commercial actors in the course of carbon-credit transactions. Chapter Two clarified 
the fact that EU carbon-credit transactions are highly regulated, and, as a result, the contractual 
performance in the transactions can be affected by the regulations. 
The second sub-inquiry addressed what contractual approaches were developed to such highly 
regulated EU carbon-credit transactions. Findings in relation to the second enquiry were presented 
in Chapter Three. Mainly, EU carbon credits are sold and purchased via stock exchanges or OTC. 
Each of the stock exchange platforms provides its own standard contractual documents that govern 
the rights and obligations of trading parties. Disputes arising from such parties’ contractual 
relationships are to be resolved by institutions of the stock exchange platforms. Dispute resolution 
does not need a court to exercise contract interpretation. 
In contrast, on the OTC market, contracts are privately negotiated. Typically, trading parties use 
master agreements to enter into long-term contractual relationships, and under the master 
agreements, each transaction is negotiated and settled individually. When disputes arise and cannot 
be resolved through negotiation, litigation may be resorted to and contract interpretation will be 
exercised. It can be concluded that the law relating to contract interpretation would be likely 
applied to resolve disputes arising from a contractual relationship under a master agreement for the 
sale of EU carbon credits OTC. 
The most frequently used master agreements for trading EU carbon credits OTC are designed by 
the International Emission Trading Association (“IETA”). The International Emission Trading 
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Master Agreement (“IETMA”) is the latest version of the IETA’s master agreements and its 
governing law is the English law of contract. When used by trading parties in the sale of EU 
carbon credits, the IETMA acts as an umbrella agreement that governs a long-term contractual 
relationship. Pursuant to the terms of the IETMA, the contracting parties will enter into a series of 
individual transactions. In each transaction, the terms of the contract will thus include terms of the 
IETMA, terms of a separately executed document that clarifies the emission trading scheme under 
which the carbon credits are traded, election of terms in another separate document for each 
individual transaction, and terms of a confirmation that confirms the content of the transaction 
negotiated on each occasion. In the contract interpretation exercise, documents and sources that 
can constitute the whole contractual relationship that was formed by using the IETMA must be 
identified. 
Chapter Three highlighted the relevance of regulations of the EU carbon market in a contractual 
relationship formed under the terms of the IETMA. It was shown that: 
(1) the terminology of the EU regulations can appear as identical to the wording and 
phraseology of terms in the IETMA itself; and 
(2) the relevant EU regulations create and change conditions that affect the formation and 
performance of a contractual relationship in the sale of carbon credits under the EU ETS. 
The third sub-inquiry then followed: in construing contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits, how 
would the law relating to the contract interpretation be applied to address the relevance of the EU 
regulations to the subject contracts? 
Two cases, Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global Steel Ltd and Armstrong DLW GMBH v Winnington 
Networks Ltd, were used in the discussion. In those two cases, the respective court ascertained the 
contracting parties’ intentions from the perspective of a “reasonable business person” in the 
carbon- credit transactions market. The judicial approach was consistent with the modern approach 
to contract interpretation generally. The “reasonable business person” is expected to have the 
knowledge that would reasonably have been available to someone in a circumstance of the parties 
when they entered into the contract. 273  Such reasonably available knowledge informs that 
“reasonable business person” in   understanding the language used in the contract and the purposes 
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behind making of that contract, and is often known as the “background” or the “matrix of facts”.274 
It is quite similar to the concept of “surrounding circumstances”275 in the contract construction 
exercise under Australian law. Hypothetically, if the court also adopts the perspective of the 
“reasonable business person” in construing the contract for the sale of EU carbon credits, four 
ways in which the regulations of the EU carbon market may be relevant in the contract 
interpretation exercise: 
(1) The regulations may be identified as the language used by the parties; 
(2) The regulations may give rise to the circumstances addressed by the contract; 
(3) The regulations may give the parties commercial purpose or reason to conduct the 
transactions; or 
(4) The regulations may constitute part of the “background” that provides evidence to 
determine the meaning of disputed terms. 
Research conducted to answer the third sub-inquiry involved an overview of the legal principles of 
contract construction under English law. Those legal principles can be categorised into three 
groups in terms of three practical tasks key to contract construction: identifying whether the 
disputed statements are contractual terms, identifying whether the terms are legally certain and 
complete, and ascertaining the meaning of the terms.276 The research employed the “three practical 
tasks” perspective and reviewed: 
(1) How the IETMA prescribes sources of contract terms that provide rights and 
obligations of parties in an EU carbon-credit transaction. The finding was that relevant 
EU regulations can act as benchmarks by which contracts shall be performed. The 
relevant EU regulations provide a context that gives boundaries to parties’ rights and 
obligations in the sale and purchase of EU carbon credits. 
(2) How the IETMA prescribes conditions by which the formation of a contractual 
relationship could be considered valid to trade EU carbon credits. The finding was that 
the relevant EU regulations provide a context where legal entitlements of carbon 
credits can be defined, and the exact provision of what are being sold and purchased is 
a vital factor in determining the valid formation of a contract. 
(3) How the IETMA assigns meanings to words and phrases in its terms, which show the 
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rights and obligations of the contracting parties in EU carbon-credit transaction. The 
finding was that the relevant EU regulations provide the source of various words and 
phrases that contracting parties use to express their agreement, as well as providing a 
context in which they form and perform the contract. 
To illustrate the application of the legal principles of English law on the construction of contracts 
for the sale of carbon credits, Chapter Four provided the hypothetical example that the no-
encumbrances obligation in the IETMA was allegedly breached, causing a dispute to arise. Three 
arguments were generated in the discussion of the hypothesis of construing a contract for the sale 
of EU carbon-credits where the dispute arose from an allegedly breached no-encumbrances 
obligation. 
It was firstly argued that the interpretation of what were actually incorporated as part of the 
contract can be affected by the judicial approach to the relevant EU regulations. The no-
encumbrances obligation is provided by Clause 5.3 in the main body of the IETMA, and Clause 
5.3.1, Clause 5.3.2, Clause 5.3.3 and Clause 5.3.4 of Schedule 4 to the IETMA. It must be 
established, first, whether those terms were actually intended by the contracting parties to form 
part of their contract. The terminologies of the relevant EU regulations could have been employed 
by the contracting parties in their negotiation, as well as appearing identical to words and phrases 
of the disputed contract.  The possible application of the “parol evidence rule” may vary according 
to whether the employed terminologies of the relevant EU regulations are considered contractual 
language or legislative language. This consideration can be affected by the interpretation of what 
reasonable business persons would have negotiated with all the knowledge that reasonably would 
have been available to the parties at the time of entering into the contract in question. Depending 
on whether the relevant EU regulations are considered contractual language or legislative 
language, the context that gives rise to admissible evidence can be identified differently. 
Consequently, what the contracting parties intended as part of their contractual relationship can be 
construed differently.  It can be argued that in deciding whether the disputed rights and obligations 
were actually incorporated as part of the contract, how the court interprets the knowledge 
possessed by or available to reasonable business persons affects whether the terminologies of the 
relevant EU regulations are considered as contractual language or legislative language. 
Consequently, the application of parol evidence rule is affected. In this regard, the center of the 
argument is not about application of the parol evidence rule, but rather that the interpretation of 
what were actually incorporated as part of the contract is affected by consideration of the relevant 
EU regulations as contractual language or legislative language. 
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The second argument was that interpretation of the meaning of the “no-encumbrances” obligation 
that the contracting parties would have understood can vary depending on the judicial approaches 
to the relevant EU regulations. The words or phrases that describe the content of the no- 
encumbrances obligation would be considered necessary for interpretation, either because it may 
have more than one contested meaning, or it may be considered having contested meanings due to 
the production of extrinsic evidence. The EU regulations provide a source of defining and 
identifying rights and interests in the subject carbon credits. If the relevant EU regulations are 
directly used by the contracting parties and may have contested meanings, the contract 
interpretation exercise must address the meanings of the words of the relevant EU regulations. Or 
the relevant EU regulations can constitute extrinsic evidence for the purpose of  interpreting the 
meaning of words and phrases, in which case the terminologies of the EU regulations are being 
used  by  the contracting parties to circumscribe their contracted-for carbon credits rather than 
being directly used. In the first scenario, interpretation of the meaning of the “no-encumbrances” 
obligation is affected by whether and how the EU regulatory terminologies are to be interpreted in 
the same or a different way as the interpretation of contractual language. In the second scenario, 
interpretation of the meaning of the “no-encumbrances” obligation is affected by which of the 
relevant EU regulations would be determined by the court to comprise the knowledge at the time 
of contracting that would reasonably have been available to a reasonable person of business.  
The third argument was that in interpreting the consequences of breach of “no-encumbrances” 
obligation, EU regulations can also be relevant in two ways, and judicial approaches in each of 
them affect the interpretation exercise. The contracting parties may directly use the relevant EU 
regulations to express what they agreed as consequences for breaching “no-encumbrances” 
obligation. Interpretation of their agreement on the consequences for breach would be affected by 
judicial approaches to words and phrases that are terminologically identical to the relevant EU 
regulations, whether as regulatory language or as contractual language. Regardless of whether the 
relevant EU regulations are directly used, they may be approached as a context that defines 
whether the “no-encumbrances” obligation in the agreement can actually be performed. Subject to 
or in accordance with the relevant EU regulations that the court considered background knowledge 
reasonably available to the contracting parties, the “good faith”, “reasonable endeavors” and “best 
endeavors” of contracting parties in the performance of the “no-encumbrances” obligation are to 
be construed. 
In a summary, this thesis has reviewed and analyzed the governing effects of relevant regulations 
on the EU carbon market in Chapter Two, standard contractual approaches in the EU carbon-credit 
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transactions in Chapter Three, and contract interpretation exercises of the trading master 
agreements under the English law in Chapter Four. In each chapter, illustrative examples were 
selected for focused research and analysis. Chapter Two selected regulations that govern the 
creation, tradability and transferability of carbon credits, to illustrate that how the relevant 
regulations can have governing effects on trading activities in a sale of EU carbon credits. Chapter 
Three selected master agreements, particularly the IETA master agreement, and certain terms that 
provide contractual rights and obligations in the performance of carbon-trading activities affected 
by the regulations discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Four selected terms of the “no-
encumbrances” obligation for illustration of how relevant EU regulations can be involved in the 
interpretation of contracts for the sale of EU carbon credits. Two recent cases provided an insight 
into judicial approaches to relevant EU regulations involved in interpreting disputed terms under 
English law. Judicial approaches to the relevant EU regulations in the contract interpretation 
exercise can affect the result of the litigated case. A more mature and uniform judicial approach 
needs to be developed. It is then presented the arguments that the EU regulations may be relevant 
to the interpretation of the disputed terms in two ways. One is that the words of the regulations are 
identical to those found in the parties’ private contract. The other way is that the relevant EU 
regulations created, confined and can alter the circumstances in which the contract is formed and 
performed. The judicial approach to the two ways in which the EU regulations are relevant to the 
contract interpretation exercise can vary the application of the law relating to contract 
construction. However, each of the two ways are attended by certain issues, which can generate 
uncertainties in the application of the legal principles governing contract interpretation. Where the 
words of the regulations are identical to those found in the parties’ private contract, the issue is 
whether the court will approach the meaning of the regulatory expressions in the same way as 
normal contractual language or as legislative language. Accordingly, different legal rules may be 
applied. Where the relevant EU regulations are part of the context of the contract’s formation and 
performance, the issue is how the court would approach the admissibility of the regulations as the 
“context” or “background”. Different approaches will result in different applications of legal rules, 
such as the application or circumvention of the parol evidence rule, whether the disputed 
contractual terms are ambiguous, or what the reasonable trading parties would reasonably know at 
the time of contracting. This thesis has suggested a consistent judicial approach whereby these two 
issues would be addressed in the light of the modern approach to contract interpretation, that is, 
along the lines of finding a construction that comports with the apparent business common sense 
and commercial purpose of the parties to the disputed contract. The described development of such 
a consistent judicial approach can be the subject of future research. 
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Appendix 
The definition of certain words and phrases appearing in this thesis are set out as below. 
“Allowance” means a unit of account representing one (1) metric tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent issued, allocated, created or recognised in accordance with the regulations of the EU 
ETS. 
“Confirmation” means a document that confirms details agreed between contracting parties 
relating to an individual transaction on the EU carbon market. 
“Holding Account” means any digital record of a party or person in the EU Registry, as may be 
specified in the Confirmation to an individual transaction, that will be used to record the issue  (if 
applicable), holding, transfer, acquisition, surrender, cancellation and replacement of Allowances. 
“Master Agreement” meant the International Emissions Trading Master Agreement governing all 
oral or written agreements between the contracting parties to undertake one or more transactions. 
“Period Traded Allowance” means, in relation to an individual transaction, an Allowance that is 
of the specified trading phase of the EU ETS and of the specified type in the relevant confirmation. 
“Registry” means the registry established under the EU ETS in order to ensure the accurate 
accounting of the issue, holding, transfer, acquisition, surrender, cancellation and replacement of 
Allowances. 
“Transaction” means an agreement between the parties to undertake one or more transactions 
(including inter alia, transactions relating to forwards, swaps and options) involving the transfer of 
Allowances subject to the terms of the Master Agreement and which is identified as a Transaction 
under the Master Agreement. 
“Transfer” means, with respect to a transaction, the transfer of Allowances from one holding 
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